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Lesson of the Day

Volume III

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures



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
Foreword

Monumental changes are occurring across the operational spectrum in both Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. As all Soldiers know, these changes affect how we conduct operations today and directly influence our way ahead.

In capturing these changes and to record how we are evolving, CALL has committed multiple Theater Observation Detachment (TOD) Officers and Noncommissioned Officers and positioned them as LNOs at multiple forward deployed headquarters in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and the Philippines. Logging in many miles and often at great personal risk, TOD LNOs are there on the ground observing and interviewing Soldiers and their leaders on what is critical today.

This bulletin is the third in a series of bound “Lessons of the Day.” Each lesson is a golden nugget on how to succeed, adapt, and overcome. They are worthy of sharing with follow on deploying forces and the institutional training Army.

Our thanks go out to those who have contributed to this edition. The willingness to invest your time, along with your candor and detail, has made this publication possible.



PAUL E. FUNK II
Colonel, Armor
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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Chapter 1

Predeployment Training

Subject: MNSTC-I Personnel Need Specific Training

Theater: Iraq

Date: 21 January, 2009

1. **Observation:** New personnel coming into MNSTC-I, filling positions as advisors will be required to attend a two day workshop that highlights the responsibilities and resources that go along with the position.

2. **Discussion:**

a. MNSTC-I does not experience RIP-TOAs as a standard field unit would. MNSTC-I is made up completely of individual augmentees. The Advisor Schools that are conducted in the states are an asset that MNSTC-I needs to take advantage of.

b. If military personnel are designated to fill an advisor position, they should be put on orders to attend a school at Fort Polk prior to their entering Iraq. Saying it that way makes it sound so easy. However, the positioning of personnel to be advisors must be thought out far in advance so that they can be put on orders to attend a school. The assumption that schools are starting every day would be a false planning assumption. It is also dangerous to assume that the Soldier has the right personality or traits to be an advisor. Planning for MNSTC-I (or whatever unit that wants this Soldier) to pay for the person to attend advisor training is perilous.

c. Potential new personnel should be carefully screened via personal interview or a through a survey prior to being picked to be an advisor. The Joint Manning Document also needs to address the requirements needed for the advisor position.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Nation building is an art that the US military has been doing for decades going back to WWII. China, Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam serve as examples of nations that we have assisted. We appear to start the training processes over each time that we conduct this mission. The US military needs an advisor MOS or Officer Specialty so that we don't lose this capability.

4. **Recommendation:** All four services develop a plan to create an advisor specialty. Institutional knowledge of this MOS would therefore be maintained. The advisor specialty could be an additional duty for JAG or IG, but definitely needs to be a school trained set of skills.

5. **Related CALL publications:** NA

6. **TOD:** COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at MNSTC-I.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Subject: PSDS-2 and DVBRCS Remote Unit Training

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 15 December 2008

1. Observation: Deployed Soldiers are not receiving training on PSDS-2 and DVBRCS systems before deploying to Afghanistan.

2. Discussion:

a. This article will cover multiple systems, components, software, and hardware, including, Predator, PSDS-2, DVBRCS, GCS, NGREP, UAV, and Networking (SIPR).

b. PSDS-2 and DVBRCS are the means by which units not having a Ground Control System (GCS) are able to monitor Shadow feed. It also broadcasts Predator, Warrior, and Aerostat video and telemetry. This feed is broadcast through the SIPR net via the DVB-RCS. The feed is also disseminated through New Generation Exploitation (NGREP), to PSDS, and finally to the SIPR laptop in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). These systems are maintained by S-6 and contractor personnel. In spite of this, there is a large misconception that it is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) function and Shadow Platoon will be the first point of contact for resolving issues. Issues that are more complex require contractor support. However, most of the issues that the Shadow Platoon sees with these systems are easily handled at the platoon level or at the unit's systems. Training of these systems would greatly enhance the ability to settle issues and minimize the amount of time units are without the feed.

c. PSDS-2 Team Discussion: The Shadow Platoon perceives that PSDS-2 is responsible for everything they provide and source of PSDS-2 feed. PSDS teams can only provide feeds that they receive (feeds from Predator and DVBRCS). Those interviewed stated DVBRCS, Global Broadcasting System (GBS), and Network issues are completely out of our hands. There is a complete lack of understanding about who controls what systems. If PSDS-2 were to suggest a lesson learned, someone in the S6 should draw up a Visio or Power Point showing what systems fall under who is control and supply contact information for each.

3. Lessons Learned: There is a lack of training on these systems. Training Army personnel before leaving their station prior to deployment is necessary. Point of contacts need to be available for Soldiers. Because of newness of equipment and software, training of systems must be built into Army training doctrine and procedures.

4. Recommendations:

- Train Soldiers supporting these systems prior to deployment. Identify Soldier operators on the Joint Manning document (JMD) and in units for continued training.

- During RIP/TOA, ensure Soldiers are available to conduct face-to-face training with their replacements.
- Commanders must decide on which systems the remote platoon teams are responsible for.
- Ensure operators are provided system POCs.
- Develop TTPs, SOPs, and Reference Sheets on remote systems.
- Include training on these systems in Advanced Individual Training (AIT).

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: SGM Elmer Feick Jr., CALL Theater Observation Detachment at CJTF-101. Acknowledgments: CW2 Randy K Haddox, USA Apache UAV PLT LDR.

Subject: Training for the Current Steady State Aviation Missions

Theater: Iraq

Date: 9 February 2009

1. Observation: The current training packages for Reserve Component Aviation units do not prepare them for the steady state mission sets.

2. Discussion:

a. During MREs (Mobilization Readiness Exercise) and ATXs (Aviation Training Exercise) National Guard Aviation units are evaluated and trained on their ability to perform battalion and brigade level air assault missions. These are important tasks but there is a disconnect with the actual missions they will face during OIF, especially at this late stage, OIF 08-10. In fact, the vast majority of the Corps Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) missions in theater are two-ship, hard surface to hard surface battlefield circulation missions. The MDMP is done at the battalion level. Training needs to be better focused on the actual mission sets to help brigade and battalion staffs, and Air Mission Commanders (AMC) deal with the rapidly changing air mission requests (AMRs) and prepare for the significant amount of in-air (during mission) changes.

b. AMRs are supposed to be submitted 72 hours in advance to the Corps AMR Cell: who is travelling, and on what day, time, and number of bags. Then the Brigade AMR cell will determine the route based on who needs to go where and when. Each stop is considered a leg. The task of the AMR cell is to get everyone (to the extent possible) where they need to go, in a timely fashion, and without creating a discernable pattern in their mission sets. The area in-and-around Baghdad is a particular challenge—many HLZs (Helicopter Landing Zone) very close together with multiple aviation units operating in the area.

c. For the most part the AMR process works well—at least from the planning standpoint. It is during the execution phase where the problems begin. At 2200 the night prior to the mission sets the Corps CAB AMR is turned over to CHOPS (Chief of Current Operations). Any new changes to the AMR must pass through them. At TF 34 the record number of AMR changes prior to mission complete is 21, but most average around 6 changes at “Showtime” (3 hours before take-off). Most of the changes prior to “Showtime” involve personnel (PAX) changes, but every new PAX requires each following leg to be recalculated to ensure that all manifested personnel are within the number of seats available. Every reduction in PAX has the potential to create a “dead leg”—one where there are no designated pick-ups or drop-offs. Fuel stops and crew rest/meals also need to be planned into the mission sets. A typical battlefield circulation mission that includes the Baghdad area may have 6-8 legs, plus fuel (either hot or cold) and dinner.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- When there are a large number of changes, the AMR process can be frustrating but it is a necessary evil of the current mission. 24 hours out the battalions and companies conduct the route planning for the various missions. Thus, some changes will require them to go back and alter the flight plans. Then at “Showtime” the AMC gets his/her AMR manifest and route plan and reviews it all with the flight crew. HLZs are reviewed, route, airspace control measures and frequency presets as well.
- When the crews are faced with adversity it is usually at the worst possible time. Changes to the route or the AMR made during the mission can cause confusion or time delays and the crews need to be prepared to make rapid changes “on the fly”. For example, they may be flying at night, under goggles when Baghdad Radio advises them of a number of zone closures or immediate ROZs (Restricted Operating Zone). They then need to pull out their zone maps and re-route the mission. At 120 knots it is not uncommon to be at or slightly into a closed zone as they begin their new route. Some of the HLZs are less than 5 minutes away by air in the Baghdad area. Baghdad Radio is the primary source for much of the immediate air space control measures around Baghdad and the voice communications are not always perfect—the amount of jamming in the area is significant.
- But, by far and away the biggest headache for the air crews are the “no-shows” (those on the AMR manifest that simply do not show up). There are SOPs for how long the crew is supposed to wait, and the AMR doesn’t allow for extra time. “No shows” may create dead legs or may preserve room for the Space A (Space Available) travelers. But, any time a crew takes on a Space A passenger it requires them to recalculate the PAX through multiple legs to ensure that there will be enough room at each stop for their manifested passengers. Again, this can be time consuming—a luxury that the crew does not have.
- “No-shows” may not show for a number of reasons: they may have gotten on an early flight Space A and not notified the Corps AMR Cell or the Corps CAB AMR Cell; they may have cancelled their trip without

notifying the Corps, the CAB AMR Cell or at a minimum the Passenger Terminal; or they simply might be late. In any case, it creates a difficult situation for the air crew as they will certainly be asked to take on Space A passengers. Bigger problems are when priority passengers are late or become “no shows” and fail to notify the CAB. Some priority passengers require the crew to wait ten extra minutes which has a minimal impact on the AMR. Others of higher priority require the crew to wait for 20 minutes—and if the PAX took an earlier flight or decided to cancel the trip outright this can leave the crews waiting long enough to impact their entire AMR, not to mention fuel consumption, fuel stops, and overall flight time.

4. Recommendation:

- Air crews need to train on the rapidly changing manifests as they are flying their AMRs.
- Mobilization training needs to be able to adapt to the changing mission sets in theater—air assault missions have been supplanted by two-ship steady state missions. While air assault missions are still important, they are few and far between, and very few are conducted at the battalion level.

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: TOD: MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 34th CAB.

Subject: Creative Ideas in Training on the Use of mIRC (Mardam-Bey Interact Relay Chat)

Theater: Iraq

Date: 16 January 2009

1. Observation: Creativity on the part of dedicated Soldiers can add value in a number of ways.

2. Discussion:

a. Upon deploying to OIF 08-10 the ADAM Cell at TF 449, the Combat Aviation Brigade in MND-B took over the responsibilities of hosting a chat room made available on both the Navy and Air Force servers—a chat room dedicated to preparing enlisted Soldiers for their NCO boards. Not only has the cell continued to build upon what had been started, they have since expanded it to include questions allowing Soldiers to prepare for the Audie Murphy board as well. It is of no coincidence that the last two “Soldiers of the Quarter” at Camp Stryker have come from the HHC at Task Force 449.

b. mIRC has become one of the most important communication tools in just about every section, in every conceivable function during OIF. Even

critical tasks, like airspace deconfliction happens over mIRC. Not only can Soldiers and leaders transmit messages real time, they can transmit documents or graphics—it is far more robust than a simple chat room. AARs and observations year after year continue to focus on the importance of mIRC in theater and the lack of training prior to units getting there.

c. This is not to suggest that mIRC is the most complicated tool in the world. It is simply that it requires a little on the job training once soldiers deploy. the ADAM Cell's initiative to continue to develop a simple training tool has had a significant impact on the individual soldiers that choose to use this valuable tool. They have built upon a simple game that not only prepares soldiers for NCO and Audie Murphy boards, but teaches Soldiers to use and become more comfortable on one of the most common communication devices in theater.

d. The game is simple, but also gives a sense of the robustness of the system. When the ADAM Cell took over the chat room there were 1197 trivia questions designed to help Soldiers prepare for the NCO board. They has since built, with the addition of the Audie Murphy knowledge, a question database containing over 1500 questions. To play, a Soldier is prompted with the trivia question followed by blank spaces for each letter of the expected correct answer. The game even anticipates some answers, for example, "seven red stripes" and accepting "7 red stripes" or even "7" as a correct answer. Each question affords approximately 35 seconds to answer, 5 seconds with the original question, followed by 5 hints provided at 5-second intervals. Each hint made visible provides various random letters of the correct answer as hints. As hints appear, points are deducted; the faster a Soldier can answer the more points he is awarded. The game tracks the userid (mIRC name) of each Soldier playing, speed of the answer, and words-per-minute. Points are calculated and tracked to the individual user and are cumulative. A Soldier can play as time allows, leave, and return with no loss of his points earned. Thus, there is always a standing order of merit (running points total) where soldiers can continue to train for boards.

e. It is a game not unlike the trivia games at local restaurants, so the soldiers have some familiarity. And as mentioned, it is no coincidence that soldiers from the HHC at TF 449, and users of the chat room, have been names as the last two "Soldiers of the Quarter". So the program works. But interestingly enough, the system is so robust that the ADAM Cell track and "kick out", or even ban cheaters. The game has the built-in capacity to protect itself from what it detects to be 'answer bots' when questions are answered more quickly than is expected for a human to respond. Though the game protects itself from other bots, errors do occur and someone is wrongfully banned. The game is very low maintenance to host though regular monitoring is necessary to un-ban players and keep things on track. Everything is maintained via logs and repeated bad conduct may result in a permanent ban if necessary, though most times this can be avoided with a quick direct-chat with the ADAM Cell. Thus, even the cheaters are learning more and more about the system and it potential uses.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Sometimes Soldiers can bring more to the fight than their weapon.
- With a little creativity soldiers can combine different training needs to one training tool.
- Servers provide an excellent way for Soldiers to prepare for NCO and Audie Murphy Boards and to become trained on the use and robustness of mIRC.
- mIRC has become one of the most important communication tools during OIF and it is important to train Soldiers on its use.

4. Recommendation:

- Consider adding heavy use of mIRC to pre-deployment training exercises to mimic the actual war time mission.
- Consider creative measures to make Soldiers comfortable with mIRC.

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB.
Acknowledgement: SSG Ockert, the ADAM Cell at TF 449 (Combat Aviation Brigade in MND-B).

Chapter 2

Intelligence

Subject: MND-C G2 Best Practices

Theater: Iraq

Date: 12 Jan 09

1. **Observation:** MND-C engagements with multiple echelons of training teams assisted with the nascent development of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) Collection Management and Distribution (CMD) system.

2. **Discussion:**

a. The successful downsizing of Coalition Forces (CF) in Iraq necessitates that proficient Iraqi government and security personnel assume security and stabilization responsibilities currently conducted by CF. MND-C worked with most echelons of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to improve their professionalism and capabilities. Following the standard of partnering with a formation one level higher, MND-C would optimally partner with an Iraqi Army (IA) Corps. Currently, the Government of Iraq (GOI) has not stood up any IA Corps. The CF has a history of focusing on bottom up development. They are deployed, however, in a culture that stresses top down decision making. Therefore, the MND-C staff decided to focus on establishing a top down link to support the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) partnered with the IA at the division level and below. MND-C staff also worked with the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I), Intelligence Transition Team (INTEL-TT).

b. Process:

(1) MND-C personnel made initial contact with the INTEL-TT to meet and exchange the lines of effort from the respective organizations to ensure unity of effort. This initial meeting led to a better understanding by the MND-C personnel regarding the proposed Iraqi intelligence architecture. The meeting also laid the groundwork for future engagements and MND-C assistance in the development of the Iraqi intelligence architecture. The building of trust with the INTEL-TT by the MND-C team affirmed that MND-C would be proactive in supporting the development of ISF CMD. This correspondingly lowered the demand for future CF intelligence enabler support.

(2) Concurrently, the MND-C staff developed the relationship with the attached MiTTs. They were able to gain the teams' insights and perspective on ISF formations with whom they are partnered. This collaboration allowed MND-C to be well equipped to assist with the development of the Iraqi MOD CMD process.

(3) When the Iraqi Air Force Transition Team (IqAF-TT) recognized that their partner formation was ready to expand, they contacted the

INTEL-TT. The INTEL-TT, based on their working relationship with MND-C, contacted MND-C for advice on what unit to link up with the IqAF-TT to assist in the development of a MOD CMD process. MND-C served as the conduit for shadow tracking requests from the 8th IA, the recommended unit, to the IqAF. This shadow tracking of the establishment of a CMD process helped ensure the establishment of an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) system between the 8th IA and the IqAF. The initial feedback indicated the response time for ISR requests is currently unacceptable. This system is in its initial stages. Efforts to improve the timeliness and response time to ISR requests are underway.

3. Lessons Learned:

- The successful downsizing of CF in Iraq relies on a proficient and stable Iraqi government and security personnel to assume security and stabilization responsibilities.
- Optimal partnering for MND-C HQ would be a non-existent IA Corps. MND-C HQ adjusted by engaging with the IA at the IGFC and the other services of the MOD.
- NTEL-TT exchanged lines of effort with their respective Iraqi counterparts to ensure unity of effort and gain a better understanding of Iraqi intelligence architecture.
- MND-C, by serving as a conduit for shadow tracking requests from the 8th IA, helped to ensure the establishment of an ISR system between the 8th IA and the IqAF.

4. Recommendation: This engagement requires the appointment of a dedicated military intelligence major with oversight and direction provided by one lieutenant colonel to ensure success. Successful implementation will result in improved IA capability, and will enhance their ability to provide security across the country.

5. Related CALL Products: None

6. TOD: SGM Donald E. Phelps, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 10 MNT.

Subject: Inclusion of Human Terrain Teams

Theater: Iraq, MNSTC-I

Date: 16 January 2009

1. Observation: Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I) does not have a Human Terrain Team (HTT) as part of their command. There is a team coming soon which will fall under the control of the J3/5 section.

2. Discussion: The Army designed the Human Terrain Team System (HTS) to assist the non-kinetic, non-lethal portion of the counterinsurgency fight. They provide cultural knowledge to help a commander understand the operating environment so that he can implement a better course of action. Current MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document (JMD) does not give authority for a HTT. However, utilizing a Request for Forces (RFF) allows the additional personnel to deploy as part of MNSTC-I. The HTT is a vital part in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi populace. It helps in many ways to build relationships.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: The U.S. military needs to deploy the right personnel to the right places. A HTT should be utilized by each command that works with the Iraqi populace to help gain their trust and explain that we are the “good guys” and are here to help.

4. Recommendation: Based on reading reports, there have been as many as 15 HTTs deployed to different areas in Iraq. Recommend due to the changing situation in Iraq, that we deploy more HTTs and less Infantry Soldiers into this theater.

5. Related CALL publications: NA

6. TOD: COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at MNSTC-I.

Subject: Red Team Member Individual and Collective Skills

Theater: Iraq

Date: 2 January 2009

1. Observation: Members assigned to a corps or higher Red Team need unique skill sets and backgrounds to operate effectively.

2. Discussion:

a. In the US Army, Red-teaming is defined as: “structured, iterative process executed by trained, educated and practiced team members that provides commanders an independent capability to continuously challenge plans, operations, concepts, organizations and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from our partners’ and adversaries’ perspectives.”

b. In theory, a Red Team is designed to look at problems from the perspectives of the adversary and multinational partners, with the goal of identifying alternative perspectives. Some of the information developed by red teams may indicate a strategy line of development. The Red Team provides Commanders with critical decision-making support during planning and operations. The team’s responsibilities are broad – from challenging planning assumptions to conducting independent analysis to examining courses of action that may identify plausible vulnerabilities.

Red Team members are experts (this is probably what the school tells commanders, but it is far from true) in:

- Analyzing complex systems and problems from different perspectives to aid in decision making using models of theory.
- An analysis of the concepts, theories, insights, tools and methodologies of cultural and military anthropology to gain insight into other's perceptions of our strengths and vulnerabilities.

3. Lessons Learned/TTP: Applying critical and creative thinking in the context of the operational environment fully explores alternatives to plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities. Applying advanced analytical skills and techniques at tactical level through strategic level and develop products supporting command decision making and operational execution. (Probably what the good-idea fairy offers up as a capability, but simply is not widely accepted. The tyranny of the moment and the reasonable limit to tactical patience is what will continue to militate against red teaming as a perceived necessity for command and staff). Finding and/or developing the right Red Team skill sets is critical to the effective functioning of the team.

4. Recommendation:

What is the most important "skill" for a member of a Red Team?

- More talking is not a good idea
- Don't believe that you know everything
- Don't assume you know what is best for your boss
 - Anticipating the command – if you jump ahead to where you think the answer is, you will develop assumptions that may not be correct.
 - Man operates on assumptions – we are more likely to follow these assumptions rather than relevant facts.
- Contingency thinking or branch/sequel planning thinking is not a Red Team function (Red-teaming is an intellectual process)
 - Developing different options for the commander to use is not Red-teaming. Cranking out products as a typical staff officer is not Red-teaming; although that is what is often expected.
 - Red-teaming is an intellectual activity. It is often seen as interesting and not relevant by the other staff. It is important for Red Team members to quickly operationalize and focus on what is relevant to the other staff sections.
- The value of directed research that has unanticipated value to other projects is a common trait of Red-teaming.

- Working directly with other staff sections in work-groups is a common aspect to Red-teaming.
- Interaction needs to be less horizontal in nature and more vertical – within the Red Team itself
- As a member of a Red Team, be prepared to work on directed projects with extensive and continual interaction with other team members
- More projects does equal better Red-teaming
 - This leads to training to a production level that leads to contingency thinking (reaction), rather than the intellectual thinking (attempting to frame a response).
- Don't get tactically engaged in the planning process – stay detached
- L2C2 – listen and learn – consult and contribute
 - Consult within the Red Team, define the problem and come up with a solution before any contribution to higher.
- Be prepared to have your work discarded between 30%-50% of the time.

General Training: Planning background at DIV and higher is a much sought quality for a Red Team member.

Red Team-specific Training: Besides the 9 or 18-week course, a Corps-level Red Team member should be senior Captain who has commanded. A command background is important because of the enormous leaps in logic throughout the process. Command also improves people skills, a vital aspect of Red-teaming. More experience dealing with people under stress is better as this aids the red team member to cue on what stress looks like to different people. The red team member will be around many people in the middle of many different kinds of stressors. The RT member has to be what FM 5-0 describes as characteristics of the good staff officer. The RT member must have a talent for doing things that you do not like to do or that you may not believe are important.

- Resourceful
- Intuitive
- Active, not passive
- Self motivator and educator

Culture: In the Leavenworth course, “culture” is covered to a nearly exhaustive extent. An adverse affect of this is that many of the graduates feel that “culture is everything” concerning understanding the enemy. Militaries and governments use coercive means to change behavior. “Culture” is that key aspect that interaction effectively changes the target’s behavior. Understanding the enemy’s culture is important, but without the consideration of “time”, the efforts of those militaries and/or governments are wasted. The ultimate goal of Red-teaming is to find the

means for the Commander to be more successful within the cultural confines that they are operating.

5. **Related CALL Products:** N/A

6. **TOD:** LTC Gordon Tate, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at MNC-I.

7. **Sources:** TRADOC News Service, July 13, 2005.

Subject: Training for Imagery Analysts

Theater: Iraq

Date: 28 January 2009

1. **Observation:** The training for imagery analysts, Officer MOS 35C, Warrant Officer MOS 350G, and Enlisted MOS 35G (previously 96D), continues to focus on detailed analysis of still photographs from the visible spectrum, despite an increasing demand for skills involving the interpretation of real time (and herein, “real time” implies “near real time” as well) video imagery from the visible and non-visible spectrum.

2. **Discussion:**

a. Modern imagery intelligence (IMINT) is one of the main disciplines for commanders and staffs in planning, rehearsing, executing, monitoring and evaluating operations at all levels, tactical, operational and strategic. Until very recently, the vast majority of IMINT have been still photographs from the visible spectrum.

b. Hand-drawn maps and sketches have been relied upon by commanders since ancient times to either supplant or replace leader reconnaissance. In fact, there exist examples of full color, hand-drawn sketches from WWI that exceed the quality and detail of photographs produced during the period. However, modern IMINT blossomed with the marriage of the photographic equipment to aircraft, as the platforms and sensors became more and more capable.

c. By World War II, “aerial photography” was the primary, or at least the most significant, planning tool for all major operations conducted by the western Allies, and a significant tool relied upon by all major parties to the conflict. During the post-war era, particularly the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union expended great resources in developing (and countering) overhead IMINT platforms. At the national/strategic level, the “Space Race”, the “U-2 Incident” of 1960, and the “Cuban Missile Crisis” of 1962 are just a few, very important examples of crises or policies that directly involved, or impacted IMINT systems, capabilities and products.

d. It is, therefore, no surprise that significant attention has been given to the skills surrounding the interpretation of still photographs. Many systems

continue to reliably produce huge quantities of still photographs of astonishing quality that are still relevant to modern military operations. However, as recent conflicts in Southwest Asia have matured, particularly in Iraq, the increasing reliance on real time video from across the imagery spectrum, and the required analysis thereof, has not, as of yet, been reflected in the training given to imagery analysts. Imagery analysts do receive training in all of the imagery that the U.S. Army collects. However, at least until recently, the emphasis has remained on analyzing and interpreting still photographs from the visible spectrum.

e. Certainly since Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the trend has been for commanders to rely increasingly on video imagery. As this process is evolving, more and more video from various sources is available at lower and lower echelons. Further complicating the issue is that the enemy is conscious of our traditional reliance on overhead imagery from the visible spectrum and has adapted to minimize its effects. This makes real-time video more effective and relevant, and imagery from the non-visible spectrum, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), forward-looking infra-red (FLIR), and other sensors, more revealing.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** The training that imagery analysts receive is too heavily focused on the deliberate analysis of still photography, in contrast to the operational environment and skill set that many of them need to provide contemporaneous analysis of real time and near-real time video.

4. **Recommendation:** While recognizing the need to maintain the skills required to analyze still photographs effectively it is recommended that the MOS courses be expanded to give the imagery analyst a more robust set of skills in interpreting real-time video, in both the visual and non-visual spectrum. An alternate recommendation would be to create a new specialty (or ASI) with addition training in the interpretation/analysis of video imagery.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Steven M. Rachal, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at TF ODIN.

Subject: Classification of Materials

Theater: Iraq

Date: 15 March 2009

1. **Observation:** Classification of material is a necessity for security reasons, but the words “sensitive” or “need to know” are not classifications.

2. **Discussion:**

a. The reason we classify material is the sensitivity of the material. Additionally, we restrict some material from view on a need to know basis. Discussions often center on the classification of documents and who has the

need to view such documents. Military organizations are very security conscious, and rightfully so. Specific sections within military organizations produce documents that are classified secret, and access to certain material is on a need to know basis. What our military policies tell most of us is that an individual, having the proper clearance, must also present a legitimate “need to know.”

b. My current mission with the U.S. military is to collect, analyze, and disseminate information to produce a positive effect on the operations of the U.S. military. In my view, certain organizations within the U.S. military unnecessarily restrict pertinent information that could enhance the operational capabilities or at least the situational awareness of commanders and staffs coming into the Iraqi theater of operations.

c. Future base closure is a prime example. Information relating to this important topic would be operationally beneficial to a division or brigade combat team commander to know well before his unit’s arrival in theater. The structure of the higher command is another example; how it is set up for functional responsibilities, resourcing and reporting. This would definitely fall into a “need to know” category.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: The classifications for sensitive material within the U.S. military are contained in regulations and policies. Military leaders should have the foresight to relinquish sensitive information to other leaders that have the proper classified designation and the need to know.

4. Recommendation: Eliminate the desire for some leaders to have subjective opinions on whether or not to release certain documents to others with a “need to know.” Follow the regulations and policies that govern classified materials and trust that other competent leaders will follow them also when disseminating information.

5. Related CALL publications: 08-42: 3ID Intelligence Newsletter.

6. TOD: COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observer Detachment Officer at MNSTC-I.

Chapter 3

Command and Control

Subject: Civil Affairs Command and Control in OIF

Theater: Iraq

Date: 2 January 2009

1. Observation: The pendulum is shifting concerning deployment of civil military operations (CMO) assets away from conventional employment of Civil Affairs (CA) back to traditional deployments for Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW) missions. Looking at the proposed doctrine, give consideration to CA's current employment model and mission profile.

2. Discussion:

a. The current model is CA Commands (CACOMs), brigades (BDE) and battalions (BNs). The CACOMs and BDEs are good, peacetime command and control (C2) assets. Experiences in OEF and OIF reveal the deployment of only slice elements of the CACOMs. The BDE, even though deployed as a BDE, have morphed into an Administrative & Logistical Operations Center (ALOC).

b. Typically, the C2 acts as the administrative control (ADCON) headquarters as the BNs are attached directly to DIV and then attached or under operational control (OPCON) to support BCTs. So, what mission does the CA BDE have, except as a quasi ALOC/ADCON type role? The ADCON role is even arguable in that the OERs, awards, etc... are handled by the MNDs/BCTs that the CA BN is attached. So, what does that leave the CA BDE to do? CA BDEs, in a conventional system, conduct C2 to CA BNs. They are not, in OIF/OEF, C2-ing CA BNs because they are C2-ed by the MNDs and BCTs. Therefore, outside of some admin activity, there is no mission profile for a CA BDE. Many interviewed stated it is a waste of assets to send a CA BDE since there is no mission for them given the new BCT MTOE.

c. Many CA BDEs have gone out shopping for work and have delved into tactical missions. There is a need for the BDE Functional Expert Support Teams (FXST). However, the FXST does not have the support or technical expertise. They are made up of CA generalists and do not have the required experts such as water expert or agriculture expert. What needs to be evaluated, from wartime perspective is, what is the role of a CACOM and/or BDE?

d. The role of the CA BN is clearly defined. However, even this needs to be evaluated. In the Iraqi model, especially as transition into a Security Agreement occurs, do CA Teams need to manage projects directly? Do they need to do assessments? Do they really need to manage Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) money, especially as the expenditure rate is low in the later stages given our dynamic transition?

e. The Active Duty (AD) CA is a “first responder” – conducting triage to the area until the Reserve Component (RC) CA follows on as a replacement. The RC CA was a long-term care mission.

f. What is the effective employment of AD CA vs. RC CA? How do they accomplish each other’s mission? How do they interact? If we are going to continue the “Plug and Play”, then we must be much more nimble in our C2 and define the C2, especially if we send company sets to joint task forces (TF) or other TF type environments in either a conventional or unconventional sense. One of the biggest issues is the C2 for CA. CACOMs were designed to provide the C2 through the BDE to the BN. Many view; this is not the case in Iraq. If we go forward in a conventional, force provider mind-set, then the CACOM model makes sense. However, to achieve the flexibility to react, the CACOM model is not adequate.

g. Functional Expert Support Teams (FXST): CA generalists are typically assigned to the team. If lucky, they have a civilian skill set that can be used/matches. This is the dichotomy between the AC and RC CA – the AC typically does not have the technical skill sets that many RC CA units have. The problem is that there are too many CA generalists and not enough technical experts. For the most part, FXST are sent out with CA generalists filling slots.

h. Bell Curve: The new MTOE has eliminated a large number of O6 positions at the BDE level. This is a positive move. Reduction of 27 of the O5 slots down to 15. The new MTOE provides more of an operations and intelligence capacity. Based on observations, this needs to be adjusted to provide more of a CA capacity. The current CA BDE MTOE would be adequate, if deployment of the BDE as a traditional BDE. Given the current employment of CA BDEs, it creates a situation where there is not gainful employment.

i. CA Troop-To-Task (T-T-T) Analysis Model: Typically, conventional commanders have embraced CA. They want as much CA as possible. However, there is a disconnect in the T-T-T analysis. What is common is the perceived need just to fill up the previous rotation’s roster without looking at the T-T-T analysis. If a T-T-T analysis is done, it is almost always a year out of date before the force projection planners see it. The projections established a year previous are out of date.

3. Lessons Learned/TTP:

- Doctrine/Organization: USAJFKSWC&S change FM 3-05.40 to recognize the CA BDE and CACOM as the CA ADCON HQ within a theater when required. In addition, when only the operational elements of these headquarters are required, deploy the unit by MTOE to be able to provide them.
- Training: Reorganize/restructure the CA Officer/NCO courses to begin to touch on the areas listed above. Expand each area into a stand-alone course that will complete the initial training. Tie “branch qualification” into completion of the courses.

- **Leadership & Education:** Engage U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) who should embrace this reorganization/restructuring in that it will create a well-rounded CA Officer/NCO.
- **Personnel:** Manage Functional Specialists within CA carefully. Do not assign a Soldier to a functional specialist team unless fully qualified for that position.

4. **Recommendation:** Form review boards from returning CA teams and conduct exhaustive review of taskings to units and applicability of those personnel to the task.

5. **Related CALL Products:** N/A

6. **TOD:** LTC Gordon Tate, CALL Theater Observation Detachment (LNO) to MNC-I.

Subject: Clearing Customs

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 7 January 2009

1. **Observation:** All Soldiers and units redeploying back to their home stations need to know the proper procedures when leaving the Afghanistan theater of operations. Not following established rules or procedures will result in grueling customs processing, delayed flights, and potential UCMJ actions.

2. **Discussion:** The “Customs Permitted and Prohibited Items List” was put out to protect the citizens of the United States. U.S. Customs employs guidelines developed by several agencies. This minimizes the hazardous materials, plant and animal products, parasites, and other harmful bacteria entering the United States.

3. **Lessons Learned/TTP:**

- Units and their personnel need to follow:
 - U.S. CENTCOM Regulation 600-10
 - Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R
 - USDA Publication for Military Clearance
 - Guide for Customs Border Protection Agents
 - Federal Firearms Regulation Reference Guide
- Units must arrange for customs personnel to:
 - Brief their unit personnel prior to actual inspections

- Perform a 100% inspection of all equipment, bags, and personnel
- Stage equipment, bags, and personnel in a sterile area
- Units requesting site inspection visits by customs need to be prepared by having all equipment and/or bags available for inspection upon arrival. Communication between the Unit Movement Officer and the Customs Office is critical during this period.

4. Recommendations:

- Visit the Customs Office and talk with the Customs Border Clearance Agent (CBCA) for permitted/ prohibited items
- Call the Customs Office if you have any questions relating to permitted/prohibited items at DSN 318 431-2100
- Soldiers need to pack a three day bag for their return movement
- Soldiers need to pack for speed, not for neatness, at the Customs Office due to volume of Soldiers going through
- Unit Movement Officers need to know which mode of cargo shipment is being used (either air or ground)

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: SGM Elmer W. Feick, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at CJTF-101. Acknowledgements: Significant contributions and insights provided by SSG Charles J. Yurk (Customs NCOIC) and SGT Jeanie M. Miller (Day Shift NCOIC of Customs).

Subject: Weapons Care in Sandstorms

Theater: Iraq

Date: 22 January, 2009

1. Observation: Heavy sand impeded weapons training at Udairi ranges. The range had no stands to stack weapons before firing and no other area to protect the weapons from wind and sand. Weapons filled with sand often jammed so badly the upper receiver had to be removed to get the bolt out. This could prove deadly in combat.

2. Discussion:

- a. Units were not instructing troops on how to sand-proof weapons. Some units had SOPs actually prohibiting cloth weapons covers due to fear that they can't tell if a Soldier's weapon is on safe. These covers had a Velcro seal and protected the trigger, bolt, magazine well, and scope.

b. Overuse of cleaning fluid attracted more sand, but too little cleaning fluid made the bolts freeze.

3. **Lessons Learned/TTP:** Units need to train troops on how to protect the muzzle and the magazine well of the weapon when on a range or in a combat environment where sand and high winds are present. Sand-discipline needs to be enforced, at all times, or weapons will malfunction.

4. **Recommendation:** Make protection of the weapon from sandy conditions a routine part of training.

5. **Related CALL Products:** N/A

6. **TOD:** LTC Elliott Levenson, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 4/1CD.

Subject: Difficulties in Establishing Brigade and Battalion Personnel Recovery SOPs

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 30 January 2009

1. **Observation:** The consensus among maneuver units that Personnel Recovery 201 (PR201) taught by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, does not adequately prepare battalion and brigade personnel to conduct personnel recovery operations.

2. **Discussion:**

a. PR201 and most documents on PR, tend to focus on the theater and Joint Task Force (JTF). While some of this doctrine can be borrowed and adapted to the autonomous, brigade combat team, there are specific requirements of the brigade personnel recovery officer (PRO).

b. An interview with the CJTF Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) suggested that when subordinate units had an isolating event, they were to report it to the PRCC and then take all orders from the CJTF as they conducted their staff battle drills. It is unreasonable to expect that the brigade will wait for division, or CJTF, guidance to initiate recovery operations. Thus, a system of coupled, hierarchical battle drills, conducted at every echelon of command, could be envisioned such that response time and assets can be more precisely directed towards recovery of the isolated person(s). For example, at the brigade level, staff actions may appear similar to CJTF, or division, staff battle drills:

(1) S1: Initiates 100% accountability.

(2) S2:

(a) Identifies threat groups in AO and their most likely course of action.

(b) Redirects collection assets, to include tactical HUMINT teams and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

(c) Assess possible compromised information and equipment.

(3) S3:

(a) Directs movement of forces and the establishment of vehicle check points.

(b) S3 Air checks airspace control measures and prepares to offer recommendations to CJTF for adapting those measures to locate the isolated personnel and diverts A/C to last known location.

(c) Coordinates with host nation partners such as police and military operating in the brigade's battlespace.

(4) S7: Monitors media exploitation and develops a missing soldier(s) profile; monitors SOMS-B radio station callers for pertinent information.

(5) S9: Identifies and queries pertinent local contacts, including civilians, government, and NGO sources.

(6) Additionally, any staff members responsible for the contracting of host nation civilians as workers should be identified and prepared to canvass them for information. This may include base workers, interpreters, and etc.

(7) A new addition to the BCT CDR's assets also presents uncharted territory. Currently, maneuver brigades have an assigned Political Advisor (POLAD), a State Department official charged with developing relationships at the provincial level. Given that there are three different means of recovering isolated personnel (military, diplomatic, and civil), is it within the realm of responsibility for the brigade commander to request, or order, the POLAD to initiate diplomatic measures to recover the missing soldier? A query of a brigade POLAD revealed that they had no specified protocols for addressing these neither issues, nor guidance as to whether the only the head of the country team (the US Ambassador to the host nation) had approval authority for the initiation of diplomatic measures. Furthermore, USAID personnel within the area of operation may be able to identify and query pertinent local national contacts. Are these State Department personnel constrained in what they can do to assist in personnel recovery?

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: Brigade and battalion battle drills and suggested SOPs for personnel recovery are needed, but are currently nonexistent. Additionally, US State department assets assigned to the brigade bring to the BCT a second means of personnel recovery, diplomatic, however, protocols for this kind of interagency effort are currently undefined.

4. Recommendation:

- BCT PROs require a course that specializes in their needs and teaches topics such as:
 - What PR information is in the ATO/ACO/SPINS that needs to get to individual soldiers prior to conducting missions outside the wire?
 - What are blood chits, how do they work, who needs them, why is it an issue if they are lost and what should we do if they are lost, how can they be ordered and how many should be ordered?
 - What is an escape and evasion plan, what are its good characteristics, and how do small unit leaders develop one? How can this be incorporated in squad and platoon-level SOPs?
 - What is the Search and Rescue Situation Report (SARSIT) and what happens when it gets sent to a higher command?
- Staff drills and strategies for the use of UAVs, vehicle check points, surveillance assets, and contacts made by human terrain teams, civil affairs, and tactical HUMINT teams.
- Case studies.
- Protocols involving nonmilitary US personnel who might assist in nonmilitary means of recovering lost personnel.

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: MAJ Kit Parker, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 3BCT 10th MTN. Acknowledgements: MAJ Damon Pfaltzgraff, BAO, 3BCT 10th MTN.

Subject: Chaplain Activities After the Death of a Soldier(s)

Theater: Iraq

Date: 5 Feb 09

1. Observation: Chaplain Operations After the Death of a Soldier(s)

2. Discussion: When there is a mass casualty situation, it is one of the most stressful moments for any unit. It is a stress that lingers, constantly alternating in intensity, but certainly stays with a unit, and more importantly with the individual Soldiers and leaders. It is important that it is dealt with immediately, with compassion, and with the total focus and involvement of the senior leaders. The Chaplains Corps takes center stage. It is important for Soldiers and units to honor their fallen and get back immediately to the daily mission flow.

3. Lesson Learned:

- Units should not forget about the Chaplains. A mass casualty situation is stressful on everyone and the Chaplains will often bear an inordinate amount of the burden caring for and ministering to their soldiers and the families back home. Chaplains are Soldiers too, and someone needs to constantly be checking to make sure that they are handling the strain as well.
- There will be an immediate crisis situation with the families back home as most stories quickly make the news well before units are prepared to release any details. It is important to remember that bodies of fallen Soldiers will be sent first out of theater to be positively identified through DNA testing.
- At the end of the memorial services the Commander and Command Sergeant Major will leave a unit coin when they salute the stand. Chaplains or another representative should ensure that they have some coins on hand in case the Commander or CSM forgets during the busy and stressful few days leading up to the event.

4. Recommendation:

- Chaplains need to be made aware of the situation as soon as possible. They should be as close to the top of the alert roster as the mission allows. They should also be made available to any survivors of the actual event, if any, as soon as the mission dictates—even if it means getting them out to a crash site, etc.
- Ensure that Chaplains have reliable means of communication. Often times they carry pagers, but if possible send runners as well.
- Chaplains must ensure that units have a good battle book for memorial services. Checklists work best as often times Soldiers and leaders are in a compromised emotional state. It is far easier to simply go down a list, checking off boxes to ensure things are done, and done correctly. Speed should not be sacrificed in an effort to do the memorial right.
- Chaplains need to ensure units have a good battle plan for memorial services so that they can minimize their involvement from a logistical standpoint. They will need all of their time to minister to their Soldiers.
- Commanders “own” the memorial service and there is no way they will give up this responsibility. Higher units must remember this. It is important to help, and to take on many of the logistical operations as possible, but the Commander must be involved—for their own spiritual well-being as well as their Soldiers.
- Executive Officer or Commander must hold an organizational meeting for the memorial right away as the current MNC-I policy is 3-5 days for the memorial service. This is a short lead time with all that the Commanders and Soldiers are going through. This is why checklists are so critical.

Very few Soldiers will be in the right frame of mind to start thinking about all that they need to do to get it right.

- It is difficult to hold multiple services, so the early evening works best. It minimizes the number of soldiers on duty and allows for travel time for senior leaders within theater.
- Try and select a forum that holds the most Soldiers. On the larger FOBs movie theaters work well, but chances are there will be standing room only. Enclosed structures minimize the impact of weather depending on the time of year. Security must also be considered.
- Chaplains must not forget about the rest of the brigade, battalion, etc. Normal business like Red Cross messages, Bible study, religious services and counseling must continue as normal. Let the other units handle the physical planning issues.
- If the unit is on a Joint Base it may be necessary to coordinate with other services for logistical needs.
- For at least the first week units will be dealing with interviews and investigations—constant reminders of the event. There will be a natural crisis of confidence that must be dealt with. For example, units with pilots involved in a fatal crash must get back in the air as soon as possible.
- Commanders, Chaplains, Medical Support and Combat Stress representatives should be on-site as soon as possible, mission permitting.
- Bring back the personnel from Combat Stress periodically just to take the unit's temperature—everyone deals with the stress differently. Begin with the Commanders so that they can send the message to the Soldiers that it is ok to seek help. But don't forget about the S2 and S3 shops—the Soldiers that are dealing with the constant information flow.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB.

Subject: Medevac Operations During Limited Visibility

Theater: Iraq

Date: 11 January 2009

1. **Observation:** The medevac standard in OIF 08-10 is for two aircraft, but during limited visibility the safety of two crews comes into question and forces commanders to make difficult decisions.

2. Discussion:

a. At 0340 on 2 JAN 09 the Combat Support Hospital (CSH) notified the 2-149 GSAB that they had received an urgent 9-line Medevac. There was a civilian contractor at Washington CASH (10TH CASH) (in Baghdad) that was suffering from an aneurysm. 2-149 GSAB is located at Joint Base Balad, where the hospital is a level 3 facility with neurosurgical capability. The weather visibility was less than two miles at Balad, Taji and Baghdad—the entire flight route to and from the casualty collection point (CCP).

b. IAW TF34 TACSOP and the MNC-I APG, less than two miles of visibility is a HIGH risk mission and requires BDE CDR/O6 approval to fly the mission so the 34th CAB TOC was notified of the 9-line. The TF 34 Commander was concerned that flying a two-ship medevac (the MNF-I guidance during OIF 08-10) would endanger the second crew due to flying multi-ship, NVG, and with heavy reliance on instruments. Guidance to 2-149 GSAB included putting together SWTs (Severe Weather Teams) or Super Crews that included only IPs with high time. This particular crew has a total time of over 12,000 hours. These crews would operate single-ship in weather conditions under 2 miles visibility not lower than 1 mile, clear of clouds, at the MSA of 500 feet or above to give adequate obstacle clearance (not with standing several unlit towers between Taji and Bagdad). His guidance to the TOC was to find a solution to provide flight following and overhead cover should he decide to fly the mission as a single-aircraft—which was within his authority.

c. The TOC contacted that Air Force CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar to see if there were F-16s in the area. The CAOC Offensive Duty Officer called back a short while later and indicated that there were in fact F-16s nearby and although they were on a mission, they could in fact provide flight following and respond should something go wrong on the MEDEVAC mission.

d. The TF Commander then approved the one-aircraft Medevac to fly the mission.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Consider sister services and utilize their resources whenever possible.

4. Recommendation:

- Flights following can be provided from a number of sources—consider them all when necessary. In this case it was the communication with the CAOC in Qatar to give F-16 sections already in the area situational awareness of a single ship MEDEVAC mission.
- While the standard in OIF is two-aircraft MEDEVAC, the commander has the authority to accomplish the mission with a single aircraft, if justified. Additional sources of flight following can significantly reduce the risk exposure of the mission.

- Limited visibility increases the risk for second crews during flight operations. Composite Risk Analysis will allow the commanders to rapidly compare various courses of action: one-aircraft versus two-aircraft, visibility and the safety issues inherent, potential for downed aircraft, route and other sources of flight following.

5. **Related CALL publications:** 05-25 Leaders' Guide to A2C2 at Brigade and below, 11 Dec 08.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB.

Subject: Field Expedient Means to Monitor Rules of Engagement in the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle

Theater: Iraq

Date: 29 January 2009

1. **Observation:** With the new Security Agreement in place it is imperative that Truck Commanders (TC) and senior NCOs continuously seek ways to monitor the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

2. **Discussion:** Many of the new MRAPs have sophisticated optics and weapons systems that allow Soldiers to rapidly and accurately engage the enemy. A key concern now that the Security Agreement is in place is the ability to monitor the ROE.

a. 5th EN Brigade has come up with some creative solutions to allow the TCs (usually Squad Leaders) to see what their gunners see, even in the vehicles where the systems do not have monitors in the TC seat.

b. In the Buffalo, the camera on the arm is viewed from the TC seat, but the CROW 2 system is not. This is actually a simple fix; there is a connector on the CROW 2's computer and an empty connector on the camera at the TC's position. All that is needed is a cable to connect them. Thus the TC can now monitor what the gunner sees on the CROW 2 screen and can make the call to fire or not. The added security is also a huge benefit.

c. The RG-31 is a little different however, in that there is no screen mounted at the TC seat. On the RG-31 (as well as an RPG cage). In an effort to provide the same type of visual security as some of the other vehicles, they found a field expedient way to get the job done—and it began at the junk yard.

d. They found a Buffalo screen at the junk yard and mounted it from the roof in the center of the cab so that the TC can turn it at an angle and see what his CROW 2 sees. Again, this adds additional security and allows him or her to verify targets to prevent ROE violations. With a connector and a cable, it simply plugs into the CROW 2 computer and they have the same type of system as many of the other vehicles—similar to a gyrocam. It aids in scanning for security as well as targeting.




Figure 3-1. CROW 2 Screen Shot




Figure 3-2. Buffalo screen mounted in RG-31

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Visually identifying targets and confirming the threat is imperative to the success of the new Security Agreement. Providing target identification to the TC's (often Senior NCOs, Squad Leaders and above) is critical to preventing ROE violations. The junk yard and some old-fashioned ingenuity can provide some simple solutions to enhance the capabilities of the newer MRAPs.

4. **Recommendation:** Consider using a discarded Buffalo screen to enhance the capabilities of the CROW 2 system. Contact the REF (Rapid Equipping Force) at Balad or Victory Base Camp and ask for the off the shelf solution.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB.

Subject: Aviation Brigade Personnel Issues During OIF 08-10

Theater: Iraq

Date: 4 February 2009

1. **Observation:** Deployment of an entire National Guard Aviation Brigade creates a massive workload for the S-1.

2. **Discussion:** In February of 2007, the 34th Combat Aviation Brigade (34th CAB) (USARNG, Minnesota) received their alert order as Task Force 34 Brigade Headquarters. They would serve as the Corps Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) for the 18th Airborne Corps (MNC-I) at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. In light of the new ARFORGEN cycles, they received adequate notice (15 months), and would conduct much of their training at home station, spending 78 days at their mobilization station. The Task Force would mobilize with the following battalions: 1-244 ASLT (Louisiana and Florida), 3-142 ASLT (New York and Missouri), 2-149 GSAB (primarily from Texas and Oklahoma, but with units from South Carolina, Maine and Minnesota as well), 3-159 ARB (an active duty Attack BN from Germany), 834th ASB (Minnesota, West Virginia and Oklahoma), and Detachment 13 (Maryland). Because the brigade deployed as a unit and nearly simultaneously—1-244 ASLT was just two months ahead of the rest of the brigade—it created a number of in-theater personnel issues that heavily tasked the small section.

3. **Lessons Learned/TTP:**

- Because TF 34 deployed together as a BDE, the submission of mobilization awards, end of tour awards, OERs and NCOERs were all due at the same time for over 2000 Soldiers. This required at least one person in the S-1 to work full time on just awards—especially to provide quality control to ensure approval at every level (especially those awards that would need to be approved at Corps level).
- After an awards board it is not uncommon to have over half the section (due to the units' closeness in TOAs) reviewing and correcting awards. In an aviation brigade you will have a larger than normal amount of awards requiring corps level of approval (Air Medals).
- During OIF 08-10, corps was going to RIP before the units, which required end of tour awards and OERs to be submitted earlier than anticipated.
- There is a normal friction between battalions and brigade. TF 34, BDE S-1 began bi-monthly S-1 staff synchronization meetings to try and integrate all of the BNs into the process, minimize the conflicts, and deal with the many states represented throughout the brigade.

- Contrary to Active Duty units, the National Guard units do not have a large rear detachment to assist, especially in personnel issues where the “state ownership” of the units creates different needs and different ways of doing things.
- An operating CAC machine was a bigger issue than the 34th CAB anticipated. Other units’ CAC machines were often inoperable for periods of time, people lose their cards, and they were responsible for servicing civilian contractors as well. This required 1-2 personnel working the CAC machine each day until 1800 hours.
- Theater releases were also a bigger job than they had anticipated. Anyone that leaves theater for any reason will need a theater release; this includes but is not limited to Emergency Leave, participation in ATXs (Aviation Training Exercises) for follow-on units, regular leave, etc.
- Strength reporting in theater also takes between 4-6 hours per day for one Soldier. There are three systems that must be entered each day (APERSTAT, JPERSTAT and DTAS)—DTAS is a theater system that was new to the 34th CAB when they got to Iraq so they had not yet been trained on it.
- Battlefield promotions are a simple process and idea for the Active Duty units and are approved by corps. They do create some manning issues for the National Guard (state allocations for certain ranks) but any problems should be disregarded in an effort to take care of the deserving Soldiers. Promote when possible (and of course deserved) and let the states deal with it later—the Soldier comes first.
- CO-ADOS and managing extensions in theater: There is no mechanism to determine the quality of the Soldiers requesting extensions, which can be frustrating. At a minimum, it is incumbent upon the unit in theater to provide a roll up of the Soldiers requesting extension and pass it on to the follow-on unit so that they can decide.
- Medical REFRADs are very hard to track once a Soldier departs theater. If an injured Soldier leaves Kuwait, heads to Landstuhl, Germany he/she could theoretically be waiting in Fort Lewis, WA for an open slot in a WTU unit at Fort Riley. Once accepted to Fort Riley he/she is kept in a “watch and see mode” with the WTU for up to 90 days. Once accepted into the WTU, orders are finally cut to officially assign him/her to the WTU. Bottom line, unit visibility on this Soldier is almost impossible to maintain. Unit commanders, understandably, want to know where their Soldier is. The S1 wants to get the Soldier off of their PERSTAT but commanders want to make sure their Soldiers are being taken care of—but ‘officially’ they are not their Soldier anymore.

4. Recommendation: Train S1 Sections in the myriad of vignettes presented and develop an SOP.

5. **Related CALL Products:**

- 03-05: Reserve Component Mobilization in Support of the Global War on Terrorism, 4 Dec 08.
- RC Mobilization, 4 Dec 08.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Overvation Detachment at 34th CAB.

Subject: Poorly Synchronized Communications between a General Support (GS) Aviation Asset and Supported Units

Theater: Iraq

Date: 30 January 2009

1. **Observation:** A general support (GS) asset, utilizing primarily aviation platforms, was experiencing poorly synchronized communications with units it was supporting.

2. **Discussion:** In the past, supported units would sometimes change radio frequencies and/or target points, without notifying the GS asset or its aviation platforms supporting the operation.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** The GS asset has instituted the following protocol to correct/minimize these problems:

- GS Battle Captain calls the supported unit to ensure all of the frequencies are correct and gets update to any changes to the mission.
- After the aircrew is briefed on the mission, the Aerial Systems Operator (ASO) also calls the supported unit to verify all of the frequencies, mission information, and any last minute changes.
- Once on station, if the aircrew cannot make contact with the supported unit, the GS unit's tactical operations center (TOC) notifies the supported unit and coordinates the troubleshooting process. As a last resort, communications will be relayed through the TOC.

4. **Recommendation:** Any GS unit experiencing problems similar to those described above use the same procedures (or a similar one) outlined herein.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** MAJ Steven M. Rachal, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at TF ODIN.

Subject: Digital Rip/TOA

Theater: Iraq

Date: 11 March 2009

1. Observation: The 3rd Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) headquartered at Joint Base Balad (JBB), Iraq, has setup a Digital RIP/TOA web page to assist the 13th ESC's assumption of command of the sustainment community in the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO).

2. Discussion:

a. A virtual Relief in Place (RIP) is a method of transferring situational knowledge and awareness prior to the physical RIP. During RIP, the magnitude of information transferred in a very short time can often be overwhelming. AAR comments from previous RIP/TOAs stated there must be a way to lessen this information overload and promote greater situational awareness and understanding for the incoming unit. In response to this suggestion, the Virtual RIP was developed by the Knowledge Management (KM) section of the 3rd ESC, but it can be used by other types of units and sections.

b. The 3rd ESC defined their virtual RIP process as a deliberate and methodical way of transferring knowledge to the follow-on unit through online communication (Web page) in the months preceding the physical RIP. In the opinion of 3rd ESC, this has produced better than expected result. The Digital RIP/TOA ensures that incoming units are provided a medium and opportunity through which to observe and analyze the operational roles and responsibilities they will be assuming. Additionally, due to unpredictable schedules, travel times, weather, and some incoming soldiers never physically connect with those that they are replacing. The Digital RIP/TOA also helps minimize the impact of these inevitable disconnects.

c. The 3rd ESC ACoS G3, visualized a Digital Relief in Place prior to arriving in theater. The task had initially been assigned to the G3 CHOPs. However, after further discussion, this was a task that was better suited for the KM section, based on their inherent tools, skills, and resources. The responsibility of transitioning the Digital RIP/TOA from concept to finished product was officially assigned to KM in July 08.

d. The Digital RIP/TOA was developed as a tool that allows incoming units to draw on the expertise of units currently in theater. Additionally, it provides a centralized location for incoming units to access and familiarize themselves with the mission, TTP's, battle rhythm, contact information, duty requirements and descriptions, as well as the geographical layout of their future station. By providing the incoming unit with the concept of operations in advance, the foundation is laid for a more efficient and objective transition.

e. The role of KM was to design the layout and flow of the Digital RIP/TOA, and to educate the users on their role in the process. As well as

being aesthetically pleasing, user friendly, and be functional. As facilitators of the product, KM created the tools, but the respective 3rd ESC sections were responsible for the content. Through guidance, feedback, and creative freedom, KM developed the site as it is currently displayed today. All information contained within the Digital RIP/TOA is considered critical to accomplishing the sections' missions.

f. During the design phase of the project, KM faced many obstacles. However, the most noted would be the agreement of a template by all sections, as each section had a different idea for displaying their information. KM incorporated all critical requirements and information from each section and developed the current template. This template provides a format for common information, as well as section-specific requirements. Through hands-on testing, this template proved to be user friendly, and was then completed with appropriate icons and aesthetics.

g. A key point is that the Digital RIP/TOA was designed using SharePoint 2007. Through the use of SharePoint 2007, KM was able to link information on the Digital RIP/TOA page with information that was currently listed on other pages within the site. This saved time and confusion by preventing the duplication of items, as well as by offering synchronous updating.

h. Another key feature was the ability to enable anonymous access. Anonymous access allows users to access the site from any SIPR machine without having to enter logon credentials. Also, SharePoint 2007 allows unauthenticated, anonymous users to view and download information posted by the sections, but ensures they cannot add, update, delete, or modify any information on the page.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: As the sustainment community headquarters for the ITO, the 3rd ESC has developed a comprehensive tool to standardize the Digital RIP/TOA process and to improve its efficiency.

4. Recommendation:

- Coalition Forces must continue to incorporate the Knowledge Management section into the evolution of the Digital RIP/TOA Process. The Digital RIP/TOA must have feedback to be successful. Should the product fall short of accomplishing the intended mission, it is the unit's responsibility to ensure that they update, modify, and continually assess the goals of the product.
- As the mission, battlefield, and requirements change, it will be necessary to ensure the Digital Rip evolves as well. Personnel will need to make sure links are still working and that the most current information is displayed. Because this will be an organic tool, it will change with every rotation.
- The Digital RIP/TOA offers the unit an orderly plan to build and structure pre-deployment training, provide insight to senior leaders and soldiers, and mitigate Soldier down-time without the loss of key personnel for supervision.

5. **Related CALL publications:** Unit Reset Handbook, 9 Jul 08.

6. **TOD:** LTC Michael J. Falk, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 3rd ESC. Acknowledgement: 1LT Aveon Bland, Knowledge Management OIC 3rd ESC, and SFC Michael Behrens, Knowledge Management NCOIC, 3rd ESC.

Subject: TIGRNET Project Tourist

Theater: Iraq

Date: 11 March 2009

1. **Observation:** Project Tourist, an initiative by ACGS, LLC and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is conducting 360 degree video mapping of MSRs/ASRs in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (AOR). The end product will be merged into the TIGRNET system on the SIPR network.

2. **Discussion:**

a. The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) funds and provides oversight of the Project Tourist program. The REF contracted ACGS as the project lead based on their expertise with the specific equipment and TTPs used for Google Street View. They were contracted to equip, organize, plan, lead, and train collectors (e.g. AEGIS).

b. Future efforts may actually include putting equipment on military vehicles and training Army personnel to do the collection. They manage and conduct the post processing of the data and deliver the final product to TEC/TIGR in multiple formats. ACGS is the prime agency responsible for successful delivery of the entire mapping effort.

c. Aegis Corporation provides the mapping team that operates from an armored SUV and began mapping in October 2008. Aegis Corporation was contracted to map 5,400 miles of MSR/ASR's in the AOR, starting in Baghdad, Iraq.

d. ACGS LLC is taking the raw picture data from the 11 camera lenses and merging it into a 360-degree video product. The collection process features a 360-degree, spherical, immersive video that is fully geo-referenced to sub-meter accuracy greater than 3 meter resolution street video. Sub-meter resolution comes from the on board Applanix IMU and DMI. The IMU captures the pitch, yaw and roll of the vehicle and the DMI measures the physical distance driven.

e. During post processing it is integrated with the GPS feed allowing accuracy within 3 feet (sub-meter), sometimes to inches, in many instances. This is very important for a geo-referenced, 360-degree, street-view video that is reporting targeting, reconnaissance and surveillance requirements. With only the GPS feed, the data will be accurate, but not to less than 3 feet.

- f. To date, the team has collected and is in post processing of over 4,000 miles of video. The final product will be very similar to Google© Street View, but with a military application.
- g. The team conducting the collection is known as The Reconstruction Liaison Team, and consists of three armored SUV's.
- h. The team can move without escort throughout the AOR with route approval from AEGIS Corporation and a signed risk assessment from a field grade officer. All of the vehicles have ITO wide transponders and are tracked through MNC-I.
- i. AEGIS has Reconstruction Support Centers at JBB, FOB Warrior, FOB Marez, and FOB Speicher. These centers provide the Reconstruction Liaison Teams with mission approvals and logistical support.




Figure 3-3

- j. The end state is to have the data incorporated into the Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR) Network. TIGRNET is a computerized map that allows the convoy commander to outline the area where his/her convoy will operate. As the data loads he/she can watch as icons emerge showing the details of possible danger areas.
- k. TIGR actually solves two problems.
 - (1) First, obviously, it provides troops with maps of their area, but with icons indicating previous incidents (good and bad) and reports of enemy activity in general. The maps are updated by users, like a Wiki, and by intelligence soldiers, so that the maps show what is out there now, including recent construction or battle damage.
 - (2) Its second use is equally important; TIGR gives troops, especially the convoy commander, an easy way to report what they saw on their missions. It is these reports that create a clearer picture of enemy activity, as well as friendly activity recent actions. Sergeants and lieutenants have long complained about submitting written patrol and after-action reports, but not getting much

feedback. Now they will have intelligence from thousands of patrols and combat actions at their finger tips.

l. TIGR intentionally looks like an Internet application. If a Soldier is familiar with one of the Internet mapping programs, such as Google Maps or MapQuest, he will quickly master TIGR.

m. All convoys enter a post-mission report via a web site form and can also attach digital photos or video. This will provide valuable information for future mission planning and execution.

n. TIGR provides the Convoy Security Company (CSC) with a mission planning tool that is more useful than grease pencils and paper maps. Adding Project Tourist to TIGR will be a lifesaver.

o. Displaying Tourist

(1) Tourist information can be displayed very simply and intuitively from within TIGR. The user zooms into the area of interest and can click to open a Tourist View of the location. He can then show a frame by frame advance along a route or play multiple images like a video to follow along a route of interest.

(2) While reviewing the route, any event or place icons displayed on the map will be visible from within the Tourist view, allowing them to view nearby areas of interest and areas of previous activities or attacks. Tourist provides panoramic 360° street-level imagery in TIGR.

p. The “Way ahead” for Project Tourist is to have it operational and running live data embedded in the TIGRNET program by 1 May 09.

q. The Topographic Engineering Center (TEC) has been named the Program Manager for Project Tourist effective 1 May 2009 and will become a program of record. Project Tourist will be renamed “Patrol View”

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- The Project Tourist video will provide great situational awareness for soldiers going on convoys. They can view the roads and towns in a 360 degree daylight view before going on a mission.
- It pulls in the data from TIGRNET providing an excellent intelligence brief of both friendly and enemy actions that have happened on that MSR/ASR.
- This should also result in reduced soldier apprehension before a mission, contributing positively to overall mission success.
- For the Convoy Security Company (CSC) Commanders, it will improve convoy planning and the decision-making for a mission.

4. **Recommendation:** The Tourist system will provide a valuable resource for pre-mission preparation, route reconnaissance and for post mission AARs. This system should be widely implemented at the BN and lower level to allow the user on the ground to improve his situational awareness of an upcoming mission and to provide greater clarity of the situation to use during AARs. Increased use of this system will improve the effectiveness and safety of combat troops on the ground. The servers for the TIGR and Tourist system video and data must have sufficient capacity to handle the demands placed on the system.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None.

6. **TOD:** LTC Michael J. Falk, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 3rd ESC. Acknowledgement: LTC Don Phillips, Rapid Equipping Force, Fred R. Kleibacker, CEO, ACGS, and MAJ Scott Romero, C-IED OIC, 3rd ESC.

Subject: Last Major Command

Theater: Iraq

Date: 1 February 2009

1. **Observation:** MNSTC-I may be the last major command standing prior to transforming into a security assistance-type organization (SAO).

2. **Discussion:** There has been much discussion as to how the three major commands (MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I) could transition into one as the US/coalition start the drawdown of military forces. Once the majority of the combat forces leave, MNC-I will probably be downsized and combined into the MNF-I, or MNSTC-I structure. One might suggest that once the primary mission changes for MNF-I, and the primary mission becomes more of a reserve and advisor role, which fits the MNSTC-I mission, MNF-I would no longer be needed. Situations evolve; security, mission, sovereignty all change over time, and for good reason. Once large staffs will soon downsize and/or consolidate functions, to accommodate the improved security posture, and increased transfer of authority to the Iraqi government.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Leave your ego at the gate when you come into this theater; justify your existence by performing your responsibilities to the best of your ability. Be flexible and adaptive to the changing operating environment.

4. **Recommendation:** Start drawing down staffs now of the three major commands in country. Many staff elements have out lived there usefulness in this country.

5. **Related CALL publications:** NA

6. **TOD:** COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observer Detachment Officer at MNSTC-I.

Subject: Loose Small Arms Ammunition Contamination

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 15 March 2009

1. Observation: During a recent weapons training event in the OEF Theater, a Soldier experienced a stoppage with his M9 pistol. What the Soldier incurred is called a “stovepipe” malfunction; the cartridge case was lodged in the ejection port of his weapon and the weapon failed to eject the spent cartridge or feed a new round into the chamber. The training event ended whereupon the soldier locked and cleared his weapon and ended the training event.

2. Discussion:

a. Upon returning from the range session, the Soldier began to conduct post operations maintenance on his M9 pistol. At this time it was discovered that there was an obstruction in the bore. A closer inspection revealed that there was a projectile lodged in the throat area of the pistol, immediately ahead of the chamber. A cleaning rod was used to determine the depth of the obstruction in relation to the chamber and to determine if there was more than one projectile lodged in the bore of the barrel.

b. A cleaning rod was then used to measure the depth to the base of the bullet from the breech end of the barrel to determine if there was a possibility that another round could have possibly been chambered behind bore obstruction if the soldier had performed immediate action. If the subsequent round could have been chambered, this would have created a dangerous bore obstruction situation. In this scenario, if the round chambered was fired this could have led to the catastrophic failure of the weapon and injured the soldier or other soldiers in close proximity to him. This was not the case, due mainly to the inexperience of the shooter and his minimal familiarity with the M9 Pistol.

c. When the Soldier was questioned about the events leading to the stovepipe the following were ascertained:

(1) The ammunition used for the training event was loose 9mm ammunition of mixed head stamp/dates of manufacture.

(2) The 9mm Ball ammunition was stored in an ammo can in zip lock bags of approx 100 rounds per bag. Not all of the bags were sealed.

(3) The ammunition was only given a cursory inspection prior to use.

(4) No attempt was made to separate the ammunition by date/manufacture or condition.

(5) The firer did not stop firing and check his weapon when he noticed a change in functioning.

(6) The ammunition was often left out on the same table where post range weapons maintenance was performed.

d. The shortage of small arms ammunition in theater (especially 9mm ball) for practice and training is having an adverse impact on Soldiers. The shortage of 9mm Ball ammunition is particularly problematic for maintaining weapons proficiency. Because of this shortage, small arms ammunition is acquired, hoarded, and stored in a haphazard manner which often results in poor storage and safeguarding from contamination.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Safe, clean, and controlled storage of ammunition in a combat environment is critical. Ammunition stored loosely is subject to contamination from a multitude of sources which can dramatically affect the performance characteristics of the ammunition. The primary cause of performance degradation of small arms ammunition stems from the use of extremely efficient penetrating aerosol solvents, lubricants and cleaning solutions. These chemical compounds are able to quickly migrate into primers and powder charges rendering ammunition inert or drastically reducing the ballistic capabilities of the ammunition. Misfires, hang fires, non fires, reduced muzzle velocity which translates into reduced killing power are the results of this phenomenon. All loose ammunition needs to be inspected for corrosion, dents, loose projectiles, discoloration, oil etc. Soldiers must exercise extreme care when handling lubricants and solvents normally associated with weapons maintenance while also handling ammunition.

4. **Recommendation:** Units should consider the following:

- Use loose small arms ammunition for training only.
- Prior to use, brief firers about proper weapons procedures including immediate action and awareness of strange muzzle blasts and malfunctions which could indicate squib loads or possible bore obstructions as a result of firing a squib load. Soldiers need to be cognizant of changes in sound of weapon firing, cycling, recoil etc. If there are any characteristics that seem unusual, Soldiers should immediately cease fire and lock and clear weapon.
- Store all loose ammunition in regulation ammunition cans and boxed in its original factory packaging until immediately before use.
- Store ammunition cans in cool dry location not subject to dramatic temperature fluctuations.
- Place desiccant bags in with small arms ammunition to absorb moisture during winter months.
- All ammunition should be stored in original factory cardboard boxes or containers whenever practical.
- Visually inspect all loose ammunition prior to storage and prior to loading in magazines for range training. Discard any rounds that show any signs of discoloration, damage, corrosion, etc. IAW local SOP's.

- If Soldiers are using weapons lubricants or solvents during weapons training, do not allow them to handle ammunition unless they have washed their hands.
- Do not allow any lubricants or solvents in the same area that ammunition is being handled or held for firers.
- When on a range, do not open up more ammunition boxes than you will be sure to fire during the training session.
- When conducting post range weapons maintenance, do not have ammunition near cleaning area. Solvents and lubricants can contaminate and render ammunition inert.
- Remind Soldiers that they are not to lubricate inside of magazines

5. **Related CALL publications:** Bringing Safety to the US Army, 06 Dec 2006.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Brian Perazone, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at the Afghan Lessons Learned Center (ALLC).

Chapter 4

Operations

Subject: Individual Movement in Afghanistan

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 31 December 2008

1. Observation: Individual Soldiers traveling within the ATO (Afghan Theater of operations) must overcome a number of challenges in order to get to their destinations. These include but are not limited to weather, terrain, aircraft availability, OPTEMPO, Unit movements, FORCEPRO, and other issues.

2. Discussion:

a. Travel within ATO presents a Soldier with challenges never seen by our Army before Afghanistan. There are a number of factors beyond the control of the Soldier that can and will interrupt, change, ruin, and otherwise alter his plans to get to his final destination. However, there are a number of measures that a Soldier can take that will enhance their chances for a successful and timely trip to their destination. The main factors that will impact and influence their ability to travel are weather/terrain, aircraft/flight availability, OPTEMPO, force protection (FORCEPRO), unit movements, and ground travel.

b. Weather/Terrain: ATO is a land of mountains, deserts, and weather that can change rapidly. Weather fronts move in quickly and ground aircraft. The mountainous terrain prevalent across a vast portion of the country is prone to weather issues. When a front moves in, it tends to lock itself into the mountains and stay. This delays flights.

c. Aircraft/flight availability: Many FOBs, COPs and other outposts are in extremely rugged terrain. These locations often have limited flight opportunities due to their locations and ability to receive flights. Flights to these remote locations are sporadic at best and are readily cancelled at a moment's notice due to weather and/or enemy activity. Always look at Short take-off and Landing (STOL) flights and rotary wing as alternatives.

d. OPTEMPO: You will often find that flights to an area are either cancelled or become unavailable due to the influx of combat troops to an area of operations. Operational needs take precedence over any other activity. Your individual needs take a back seat to maneuver units. Be prepared to get bumped, even at the last minute.

e. FORCEPRO: Sudden upswings in enemy activity in the area of your destination or point of embarkation can restrict or delay flights. Many smaller FOBs have limited use airfields and require a specific amount of force pro to secure the LZ/HLZ for an inbound flight. If these FORCEPRO assets aren't available to secure the LZ/HLZ, the flight won't happen.

f. Unit Movements: The influx of new units and or units RIP'ing in/out of theater puts additional strain on aircraft and movement. While most units will have air coordinated so that they have dedicated aircraft, there are often stragglers that don't. As part of a unit movement you will have to contend with getting on aircraft in which they are given preference.

g. Ground travel: Alternative travel is possible. Most units will conduct convoy operations in order to pick up their own Soldiers at air terminals. If your follow-on movement is by ground and you don't have a planned movement, look for the three to four up-armored vehicles sitting outside the terminal and ask where they are going. You may be surprised to find that they are passing by where you need to go.

3. Lessons Learned/TTP:

- Travel is slow, arduous and more often than not goes awry.
- You must be flexible with your schedule. If you have a meeting in another part of the country that you simply cannot be late for or miss, you must allow at least two days for travel on the front end. The easiest way to plan is to allow at least a full day/night at each way point in your journey.
- Movement is progress. You may have to settle for a flight to a side destination that will then allow you to connect to your final destination. Forward movement is the goal but lateral movement sometimes is the only way to eventually move forward.
- STOL (Short Take Off and Landing) flights are often scheduled at the last minute. Make yourself available at all times to take advantage of these flights.

4. Recommendations:

- Travel as light as possible. Limit your baggage to one carry-on if at all possible (this gives you options with STOL flights as STOL's often have space limitations).
- Plan to stay longer in any location where you will make a connecting flight (at least one day and one night at each stop on a trip in theater).
- Check for rotary wing assets (these are usually not at the PAX terminal for fixed wing ops).
- Do not be late for manifest calls.
- At a minimum, plan a day extra travel on each end of trip.
- Make tentative overnight accommodation plans at any location you are on space A.
- As soon as you arrive at an interim location, sign up for Space A (this puts you on the roster in order of precedence for further Space A flights).

- If you need to be somewhere by a certain time, camp out in the PAX terminal and wait for every opportunity.
- Bring a book – or two.

5. **Related CALL Products:** None.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Brian Perazone, Theater Observation Detachment at the Afghan Lessons Learned Center.

Subject: A Combat Multiplier - Military Working Dogs

Theater: Iraq

Date: 15 Jan 09

1. **Observation:** Military Working Dog teams are an underutilized combat multiplier. Full utilization will greatly enhance the capabilities of theater units and provide an extra measure of safety for Soldiers.

2. **Discussion:**

a. **Combat Tracking Dogs (CTDs):** Combat Tracking Dogs have the ability to track an insurgent back to the point of origin from an IED blast site, track personnel who survive ambushes, and track lost or missing friendly forces. Combat Tracking Dogs have been successful in performing these operations in MND-C.

b. **Military Working Dog (MWDs):** Military working dogs are highly successful in detecting smuggled explosives and weapons at border crossings and Entry Control Points (ECPs). In addition, the presence of MWDs provides a visual deterrent to anyone engaged in smuggling operations.

c. **Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs (PEDDs):** The use of Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs can provide maneuver commanders additional capabilities during patrols. Properly employed, these dogs are an indispensable asset in the apprehension of fleeing suspects and in searching buildings for weapons caches, hidden explosives, and suspects. The presence of a MWD provides a visual deterrent to anyone considering illicit activity targeted at a patrol.

d. **Explosive Detector Dogs (EDDs):** Explosive Detector Dogs are similar to PEDDs except that they are assigned to engineer units and specialize in detecting explosives. They are not specifically trained in the patrol aspects of MWDs.

e. **Specialized Search Dogs (SSDs):** The use of Specialized Search Dogs provides commanders with an asset to detect weapons and explosives caches and to conduct searches in advance of P.O.T.U.S. or other VIPs. Additionally, SSDs have the ability to work off-leash enabling the dogs to

quickly search large areas and keep Soldiers at a safe distance from a potential blast.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Combat Tracking Dogs should be utilized to track insurgents from IED emplacement sites back to their point of origin
- Employ Military Working Dogs at ECPs to aid in detecting smuggled weapons and explosives and to provide a visual deterrence
- Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs should accompany patrols for the purpose of pursuing fleeing suspects and detect hidden explosives and weapons caches
- Explosive Detector Dogs have many of the same capabilities as PEDDs
- Specialized search dogs should be used to clear areas in advance of VIPs and to search large areas for explosives off leash

4. Recommendations: Military working dogs offer a wide range of capabilities from explosives detection, to suspect apprehension, to tracking capabilities. Because of their imposing physical stature dogs have an intimidating presence. Therefore, their employment can have a calming effect in difficult situations. Moreover, military working dogs save Soldier's lives. Commanders should utilize every opportunity to employ military working dogs.

5. Related CALL Products: Handbook, Commander's Guide to Military Working Dogs, Nov 08.

6. TOD: SGM Donald E. Phelps, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 10MNT.

Subject: Combat Firing Techniques

Theater: Iraq

Date: 26 January 2009

1. Observation: Civilian contractors gave instruction on combat firing techniques with the M-4 carbine at Udairi Range. The techniques involved moving in body armor, as well as, wearing eye protection and gloves while firing. There was value in the instruction as Soldiers without prior combat experience had never performed combat firing techniques.

2. Discussion: Modern body armor has changed individual fighting tactics. In the past, we fought with an eye to the use of natural or man-made objects for cover. Now, we are trained to use an exposed, 'North-Hollywood Shootout' style of combat firing where we rely on the body armor to protect us. Thus, new techniques must be taught for combat firing with the carbine.

3. **Lessons Learned/TTP:** The earlier this can be trained, the more accustomed the Soldier will become to employing these techniques. This removes one more detractor to his combat performance.

4. **Recommendation:** Combat firing drills need to be taught as part of predeployment training before a unit leaves home station.

5. **Related CALL Products:** N/A

6. **TOD:** LTC Elliot Levenson, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 4/1CD.

Subject: Turning off Duke when using a Jaguar

Theater: Iraq

Date: 28 January 2009

1. **Observation:** When using resources from other services it is imperative to ensure they follow all standing operating procedures and they should be spot checked as well.

2. **Discussion:**

a. During a route clearance mission where a Jaguar (a remote controlled tank hull with heavy rollers) was employed there were a number of problems with the remote control system. At first it was believed that the 4 Apache helicopters on station were disrupting the link with their advanced systems. The Jaguar's remote control system kept resetting, seemingly every time the Apaches came near the vehicle.

b. As it turned out, the disruption was caused by the EOD team provided by the Navy. They had left the Duke on atop their vehicle. While it was SOP to turn off the Duke, and the EOD team had been at the pre-mission briefing, there was no mention of this SOP. The unit was unaware that Navy EOD personnel did not consider it SOP to turn off their Duke during this type of operation.

c. Unfortunately, the error was not recognized until the mission was complete. The Jaguar lost control and crashed into the back of a 33-Long. Fortunately, there were no injuries and only minimal damage to the 33-Long.



Figure 4-1. Jaguar crashed into rear of 33-Long

3. Lessons Learned/TTP:

- Spot checks during a mission are important and sometimes the obvious ones are overlooked.
- Attached units must be briefed on your unit SOPs.

4. Recommendations: Insure that attached units are briefed on your unit's SOPs. Add a check to pre-combat inspections to insure electronic systems are turned on/off as appropriate.

5. Related CALL Products: N/A

6. TOD: MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34CAB.

Subject: Multiple Ways to Employ the Husky during Route Clearance Missions

Theater: Iraq

Date: 28 January 2009

1. Observation: Depending on the type of road and the mostly widely used IEDs in an area, the Husky provides a versatile option to lead a route clearance mission.

2. Discussion: Depending on the type of road and the mostly widely used IEDs in an area, the Husky provides a versatile option to lead a route clearance mission (See Figure 1). For example, within the city limits of Baghdad, EFP (Explosive Formed Projectile) is one of the greatest threats to route clearance Engineers. The Husky becomes a good choice as the lead vehicle simply because it is a one-man vehicle, thus limiting the potential casualties should it be struck. The Husky also provides a great observation platform. Additionally, the operator's compartment is so small relative to the large vehicle that adds a much higher margin of safety than the other passenger vehicles. Because of the Husky's speed and the primary threat being EFP, it is not always necessary for the Husky to even drop its panels.



Figure 4-2. Husky MK1 (Mine Detection Vehicle)

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Unimproved roads, however, are another story all together. Once again the Husky makes a good choice as the lead vehicle, but this time because with the panels down and the selector on Locate 2 it can detect metal object down to 18 inches. Staggered Husky's as the lead two vehicles can cover the entire road—which is also not a bad choice on hardball roads where staggered Husky's allow for one panel on the road and one panel off the side of the road. Two Huskies can cover a lot of ground and can still detect metal down 18" through the asphalt.
- On an unimproved surface, or a hardball where the Huskies are in the lead, 55th MAC (Mobility Augmentation Company), 5th Engineer Brigade prefers to follow with the Buffalo—the arm on the Buffalo is much stronger than the Husky's ferret arm. Then follows in the Recce (GERV) for command and control reasons. The remainder of the order of march is not as important, but the Platoon Sergeant typically brings up the rear in his Cougar. Both the Recce and the Cougar have Gyrocams as well.
- The primary IED threats are from Anti-Tank mines that the violent extremists find along the Iran-Iraq border—remnants from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. It is not uncommon to find old piles of artillery rounds, or mines that have been uncovered from the passage of time and weather.
- The next most common threat is from HME (home-made explosives) usually detonated by pressure plates or crush wire. In both cases, the liberal use of Huskies in the lead has helped them to seek and destroy these prevalent threats.
- So whether using the Husky in the lead because there is only one person at risk, or as the primary IED hunter it is an extremely versatile tool in a Platoon Leaders toolbox. It is important for the incoming Platoon Leaders to take the time to know the vehicle and understand its capabilities.

4. Recommendations:

- New Engineer Platoon Leaders going to Route Clearance units need to find the resources to know and understand the capabilities and limitations of the vehicles and equipment they will be using.
- The Husky is a versatile vehicle that can detect metal object 18” below the surface, through asphalt, at speeds up to 35 kmph/ 21 mph (See Figure 2).
- Different regions of Iraq have different IED threats and will require careful thought as to the order of march.

5. Related CALL publications: 08-16: Route Clearance Handbook, 11 Dec 08.

6. TOD: MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB. Acknowledgement: 1LT Mackey and SFC Thompson, 55th MAC (Mobility Augmentation Company), 5th Engineer Brigade.



Figure 4-3. Husky ink-mark indicating metal below the surface

Subject: Force Protection Guards

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 26 February 2009

1. Observation: Force Protection (FP) Guards in Afghanistan consist of: U.S. Military, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), local national (LN) guards and third country national (TCN) guards.

2. Discussion: FP is a top priority for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. A major part of FP is the Security Force that mans the gates, towers, conducts external and internal patrols, and guard high occupancy facilities (HOF). In Afghanistan there are different groups conducting security force duties: the U.S. military, the ANSF (either the Afghan National Army (ANA) or the Afghan National Police (ANP), LN guards and TCN guards. Each group has its advantages and disadvantages when it

comes to: billeting, rations, cost, Afghan public perception, vetting and operational considerations. Each group needs to be looked at in their totality when selecting the right one, or combination of security forces for a Forward Operating Base (FOB).

a. U.S. Military:

- (1) Billeting: U.S. Military must be billeted on a FOB. Space on a FOB is limited, restricting the amount of U.S. military that can be dedicated solely to force protection missions.
- (2) Rations: U.S. Military typically eat at U.S. operated dining facilities on the FOB. U.S. Military consume operational rations (MREs) that are relatively expensive when operating off the FOB.
- (3) Cost: The relative cost (pay and benefits) of using U.S. military makes it the most expensive option for security force missions.
- (4) Vetting: U.S. Military do not require vetting.
- (5) Afghan public perception: U.S. Military are foreigners in a country that would rather not have foreigners. The U.S. military is considered disciplined in the use of their weapons.
- (6) Operational considerations: U.S. Military should not conduct FOB security missions so that they can conduct off the FOB missions that only U.S. Military forces are best suited to conduct. This is the main reason that other non-U.S. Military organizations are needed to fill the security force mission.

b. Afghan National Security Forces (ANA and or ANP):

- (1) Billeting: ANSF personnel do not billet on the FOBs. Their billeting cost is provided by the Afghan government.
- (2) Rations: ANSF personnel consume rations provided by the Afghan government at no cost to the U.S. government.
- (3) Cost: There are no incremental costs in using ANSF personnel for security force missions on or around the FOBs.
- (4) Vetting: ANSF personnel are currently going through vetting to participate in training as is required by U.S. law. There are large numbers of ANSF personnel that have not been vetted. Anti-coalition forces try and may have infiltrated the ANSF. It's possible that enemy forces are working as security forces on the FOBs.
- (5) Afghan public perception: Using ANSF personnel for force protection puts an Afghan face on the FOB, and reduces the reminder that foreign forces are in Afghanistan.

(6) Operational considerations: The FOBs are frequently located with Afghan bases. The ANSF should not be used exclusively to provide security forces for the FOBs. Like the U.S. Military they have capabilities that are better used off U.S. FOBs. Close coordination with local ANSF pays significant dividends in FOB security.

c. Local National Guards:

- (1) Billeting: LN guards billet at their own expense off of the FOB.
- (2) Rations: LN guards consume rations at their own expense off the FOB.
- (3) Cost: LN guards are the most cost effective method of guarding the FOBs.
- (4) Vetting: Contractors are required to vet the LN guard force. Their names are provided to the U.S. Government to vet, ensuring their reliability and the fact they are not on any U.S. human rights violator lists. As with the ANSF, anti-coalition forces may penetrate locally hired contract guards working the FOBs. LN guards are about as reliable as ANSF personnel once they are vetted.
- (5) Afghan public perception: LN guards are a good way to put an Afghan face on the FOB. Hiring LN guards puts money into the local economy which creates good will for the U.S. government and benefits the Afghan economy.
- (6) Operational considerations: LN guards significantly improve vehicle and personnel searches at entry control points. Leaders should not become overly dependent on local guards since they can be subjected to influence or infiltration by anti-coalition forces.

d. Third Country National Guards:

- (1) Billeting: TCN guards can either be billeted on or off the U.S. FOB, depending on the contract. Billeting off the FOB is preferable due to space restrictions. Billeting off the FOB will be more expensive than billeting on the FOB.
- (2) Rations: Like billeting, rations can either be provided to TCN guards by the U.S. Government or not, depending on the contract. Feeding TCN guards on or off the FOB makes little difference in cost to the U.S. Government, and should be an operational decision.
- (3) Cost: TCN guards cost considerably less per guard than U.S. military personnel, but considerably more than LN guards.
- (4) Vetting: Contractors are required to vet their employees. Guards' names are provided to the U.S. Government for vetting, ensuring their reliability and that they are not on any U.S. human

rights violator lists. Non-Muslim TCN guards can be assumed to be less easily infiltrated by anti-coalition forces.

(5) Afghan public perception: TCN guards, especially if they are non-Muslims, will be in the same category as the U.S. military, foreigners in a country that would rather not have foreigners.

(6) Operational considerations: TCN guards should be used for security on gates, towers and as interior guards on high occupancy facilities. TCN guards should not be used for duties outside the FOB.

e. Force Protection Guard Mix: Determining the proper mix of security force guards is a major decision for the FP Manager. Costs, logistics, reliability and operational reasons should all be considered in determining the proper mix of security force guards.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: Force Protection Managers should determine the best mix of U.S. Military, ANSF, LN and TCN guards for their security forces. LN guards should be on the exterior posts, and TCN guards on the interior posts. U.S. Military should be used primarily to supervise LN and TCN guards. The ANSF should only be used as a last resort as guards on U.S. FOBs, as they are better used for other missions outside the FOB.

4. Recommendation:

- U.S. Military should be used in small numbers to supervise the use of other guards. U.S. Military should be used at extremely sensitive facilities.
- ANSF should be used as a last resort. Like the U.S. Military they have more important missions to accomplish.
- LN guards are the preferred guard for all exterior postings. LN guards are the most cost effective for the U.S. government, best used on outer layers of FOB security, best for the local economy and in good for public perception.
- TCN guards are professional, reliable and relatively cost effective. They are best used on interior posts and at the exterior when mixed with locally hired guards.
- A multi-layered approach using a coordinated security plan will yield highly effective force protection when:
 - ANP provide vehicle/roadway control.
 - LN guards conduct initial screening and primary interface with the public.
 - TCN guards man entry control points, towers and high occupancy facilities.

- U.S. Military conduct random access measures and highly dynamic quick reaction force.

5. **Related CALL publications:** CALL Handbook, #07-19 Base Defense, 2 Mar 2007.

6. **TOD:** LTC Rick McConoughey, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment Officer at Combined Security and Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC–A). Acknowledgement: LTC Jay Gilhooly, CSTC–A.

Subject: Use of a COLT during Route Clearance Operations

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 17 March 2009

1. **Observation:** Route Clearance Platoons (RCPs) are involved in an increased number of direct fire events and complex ambushes in Afghanistan. Recently, a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) supplemented the standard RCP with a COLT (Company Lasing Team) element and in its first mission, proved invaluable.

2. **Discussion:**

a. Because of the slow rate of march and periodic stopping to search for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), RCPs are finding themselves to be an increased target of direct fire and complex ambushes in Afghanistan. Typically, the RCP has three options: speeding thru the kill zone to resume the mission away from enemy fires, stopping and gaining fire superiority before continuing the mission, dismounting to pursue and destroy the enemy. The latter two options can lead to more complex problems, if the enemy is using a SAF attack to delay progress to facilitate IED emplacement further down the route, signal other insurgent forces of an approaching CF, and the possibility that dismounts could be lured into an ambush or a situation with a higher probability of collateral damage.

b. To expand the options available to the RCP leaders, one brigade in Afghanistan recently augmented the RCP with a COLT. The brigade staff reasoned that the COLT would give the RCP additional options for aggressive response. Coordinating with fixed wing and rotary wing close air support (CAS) or calling for, and coordinating, indirect fires allows aggressive options concurrently with mitigating the risk of the most aggressive options.

c. On the third route clearing operation after the brigade implemented this plan, the utility of the COLT to the RCP was demonstrated. The RCP found itself in a complex ambush, when a command wire IED detonated, jackknifing the lead MRAP with its mine roller. When CF personnel dismounted to move forward to assess casualties, the enemy initiated a SAF attack with RPGs. Pinned against a cliff, the CF element in contact called upon its COLT to coordinate both fixed wing CAS, which was the first response when the TIC (troops in contact) was declared, and then AWT

which arrive some time into the 45 minute firefight. When casualties from the disabled vehicle were assessed, one was declared Urgent Surgical and the RCP leader then tasked the COLT to move with the platoon sergeant to establish a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) for the responding MEDEVAC. The COLT established the HLZ and ran all communications with the inbound aircraft, coordinating the AWT to help suppress the enemy while the casualties were loaded onto the aircraft and evacuated.

3. Lesson Learned: The COLT's equipment, training, and presence facilitates the combined arms fight during combat engineering operations. Planning for the COLT's participation in route clearing operations benefits force protection while enhancing the offensive capabilities of the RCP.

4. Recommendation:

- Fire support planning for the route clearance operations can vary according to whether or not the RCP is a direct support (DS) or general support (GS) unit. If it is a DS RCP assigned to a maneuver battalion, fires planning can be worked in conjunction with the BN fire support officer (FSO). If the RCP is a GS unit, then the fires planning should be coordinated through the supported brigade's fire support coordinator (FSCoord). The latter is an important point, because there are some route clearance assets that belong to general support task forces that may not have the personnel for proper fires planning.
- In the case described, then COLT was trained and equipped to establish an HLZ and to coordinate CAS. COLTs composed of Joint Fires Observer (JFO) qualified individuals who have been trained in establishing HLZs either at the unit level or at Air Assault or Pathfinder schools offer the most versatility and the highest probability for success.
- Additionally, a well rehearsed RCP may consider designing training exercises where crew served weapons gunners in the vehicle turret coordinate with the COLT to direct their fires effectively. COLTs have all the necessary technology platforms for precise target localization and this information, critical in the counter-insurgency (COIN) fight where restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) usually apply, can be exploited by the RCP leaders to direct lethal fire on the enemy when CAS is not available.

5. Related CALL publications: Route Clearance Handbook, 24 Apr 08.

6. TOD: MAJ Kit Parker, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 3BCT 10th MTN.

Subject: Attached, Embedded, and Combat Multiplier Personnel Etiquette

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 28 February 2009

1. **Observation:** Since the beginning of the GWoT, MTO&E maneuver units have been supplemented with attached or embedded combat multipliers to address the diversity of challenges in the COIN fight.

2. **Discussion:**

a. MTO&E maneuver units are supplemented with a variety of combat multipliers in support of combat and reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This has presented unique challenges to the host unit, and to the multipliers, some of whom are civilians. Multipliers including dog teams, explosive ordnance details (EOD), tactical psychological operations teams (TPTs), civil affairs teams (CATs), human intelligence collection teams (HCTs), medics, civilian human terrain teams (HTTs), political advisors (POLADs), DA civilian engineers, and members of sister services that are augmenting Army units, all of whom may be required to operate outside the wire.

b. This can make for very complicated situations where patrols are being launched with numerous people with heterogeneous situational awareness, training, knowledge of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment. Furthermore, combat patrols that require interface with host nation officials or civilians might be comprised of numerous personnel whose missions require different actions on the objective.

c. An example is a recent mission to visit a provincial health minister, where a brigade surgeon, a member of a human terrain team, and civil affairs personnel all needed different information from the minister in order to assess and evaluate opportunities for cooperative medical operations, CF training support, medical facilities, and capabilities.

d. Coordinating an “order of march”, where all multipliers get their missions accomplished during a single sit-down meeting, or Shura, requires recognition of the main effort, detailed mission planning, rehearsals of security procedures, patrol routes, and the operating procedures of the security detail assigned to transport the multipliers to the meeting, provide security during the meeting, and then afterwards move the multipliers safely back to a forward operating base. Planning for such missions must be initiated prior to the patrol, but are best supported by prerequisite training on both the part of the host unit and attached or embedded combat multipliers.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Branches whose warfighting functions that are often times performed by attached or combat multipliers should advocate for Army Regulations that mimic AR 75-15, which details how units should use and support EOD teams.

4. **Recommendation:** In the absence of Army Regulations that detail the support requirements of attached or embedded combat multipliers, the following recommendations may prevent confusion and facilitate mission accomplishment:

- Receiving/Host Unit:
 - S1 – Tracks multipliers in personnel roll up.

- SGM – Ensures that BDE standards are readily available to multipliers in the form of a document or presentation and has the NCO chain of command prepare a block of instruction that orients the multiplier to the BDE/BN SOPs. Part of this block of instruction should include assessments of the multipliers to determine if further training is necessary. For example, on weapons safety, preparing field gear, movement in vehicles, OPSEC, and etc.
- CDR/DCO/XO – Ensures that there is an Officer and NCO chain of command for multipliers.
- S4/Supply – Provides unit-specific, or mission-specific, equipment that the multiplier might not have.
- Develop a unit sponsorship program for embedded, attached, or combat multipliers.
- Attached or embedded combat multipliers:
 - Becomes familiar with host unit's SOPs and adhere rigidly to their standards.
 - Reports to the chain of command with a mission statement, mission support requirements, informs the chain of the multiplier's rating scheme, reporting requirements to the parent unit, and clarifies reporting requirements to the attached unit.
 - Seeks additional or special instruction from the CDR, on protocol on clearing products and reports being sent up the multiplier's parent unit chain of command.
 - Reports all sensitive items through the appointed support chain and seeks whatever mission specific or unit specific equipment that is required.
 - Through appropriate forums and by networking, informs staff members of their mission and mission requirements. Looks for opportunities to support the host unit in mission planning and other requirements as determined by the chain of command.
 - Prepares regular SITREPs for the host unit chain of command to inform them of your mission and equipment status, if you are accomplishing your mission, and other pertinent information.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** MAJ Kit Parker, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 3BCT, 10th MTN.

Subject: Information Operations: A Perspective from the Field

Theater: Philippines, OEF-P

Date: 23 March 2009

1. **Observation:** FM 3-13 (Draft, Information Operations) includes several changes from FM 3-13. These changes bring IO doctrine in line with FM 3-0; however, there exists some cognitive tension with the new draft manual.
2. **Discussion:** During a recent VTC with a force providing commander to OEF-P, I was asked to give my assessment of FM 3-13 (draft). I was familiar with the last edition of FM 3-13 and JP 3-13, but I honestly had not read the new draft of the Information Operations Army Field Manual. Instead of digging right in, I thought I would evaluate how OEF-P conducts IO in relation to the Army IO tasks and capabilities, and then read the manual. The most successful Information Operations to achieve desired effects are by commanders that understand the maximum effective range of an idea is far greater than an M-4 rifle. In order to achieve that effect commanders understand that they need to be proactive with their use of PSYOP, Combat Camera and with their PAO to get messages out to the public domain. Successful commanders understand their audiences because they listen (active listening) and understand the population's need. They continually assess their environment and adapt to those changes. They understanding that when talking to reporters that you are actually talking to the reporter's audience, not just the reporter. Commander's that operate in the information domain understand that they communicate globally with many audiences; their soldiers, other leaders, and friendly, enemy and neutral populations.

- Army IO Tasks and capabilities:
 - Military Deception: The effect of military deception operations is to deceive or exploit. The most successful military deception operations are conceived and planned in conjunction with an operational plan; as an integral part of the plan, not as an afterthought. Deception planning should begin in the G-5/J-5 staff sections. I understand now that deception is being taught as part of SAMS. This is an excellent. The owners and synchronizers of military deception operations should be the planners.
 - Command and Control Warfare: This is described as attacking C4I and supporting the exploitation of these attacks (physical attack, electronic attack, electronic warfare support, computer network attack, computer network exploitation, etc.). In a foreign nation, under a visiting forces agreement, these types of operations require an immense amount of coordination. These operations are intended to disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy, to name a few intended effects, an enemy's command and control capabilities. The responsibility for controlling these activities within a staff or task force fall to the Operations Center or OPCEN, which is normally the G/J-3 and the G/J-2.
 - Information Protection: When we are talking about information protection we are talking about Information Assurance, Computer

Network Defense and Electronic Protection. The G/J-6 is in charge of all communication systems. The intended purpose of Information Protection is to secure and deny access to the enemy from information on our communication systems which is clearly a communication officer's function.

- Operational Security: This involves both the security of operations and physical security. Both of these types of security are protect ourselves from attack and from allowing the enemy to gain knowledge of our future operations by viewing our actions. This is clearly a G/J-3 function. In addition, counterintelligence is an IO capability that falls under operations security. Counterintelligence operations are normally run by the G/J-2 and coordinated as or within an operation with the G/J-3.
- Information Engagement: Information engagement involves the integration of PSYOP, Combat Camera, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as Army IO capabilities. The intended purpose is to influence and inform target audiences, whether they are friendly, enemy or neutral audiences. This clearly falls to the PSYOP officer, PAO and G/J-7 as a staff responsibility to synchronize.
- Clearly out of all the Army IO tasks the only one that the IO officer (FA30, G-7) is responsible for is Information Engagement. While all of the other IO tasks involve either the attack, defense, protection or deception of information, whether it is friendly of enemy, the G-7 has no staff responsibility other than to coordinate (to say the G-7 synchronizes these other tasks, in my experience, might be an over statement, but then again it really depends on the soldier). How does this assessment compare with the Joint Doctrine, JP 3-13? It is generally in line with the Joint Doctrine, but the Joint Doctrine uses the word "synchronize" as the J-7 responsibility for Joint IO tasks. The Joint Doctrine was published in 2006, so it is several years old and is due for a rewrite. The Joint Doctrine also includes Civil Military Operations as an IO capability, which the Army doctrine does not. The above assessment does line up with the current FM 3-13 (draft) construct.
- While Part I of FM 3-13 (draft) might be a bit wordy and may lose some readers with the FM's theoretical construct, but it is right on the mark. Part II accurately portrays how IO is working (when I say "working" I mean, how it is being done in a positive way that achieves results), as current doctrine should do. While there are some changes compared to the current FM 3-13, the changes are positive ones that reflect how the Army fights and in my opinion focuses the effort of the G-7s and FA30 officers. The Draft focuses the G-7 on Information Engagement, instead of as a synchronizer of all the IO tasks. This is a step in the right. To say that the G-7 synchronizes all of the IO tasks is a stretch.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: Warfare is waged in the air, at sea, on land, in space, and first and foremost, in the mind. Actions in conflict begin in the human brain and are governed by thought; both logical and emotional. People engaged in warfare across all spectra, make decisions based on reason and emotion. Military

operations, especially ones battling for ‘human terrain,’ should focus on influencing the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of those involved. Warfare is fundamentally is a human social activity. One must recognize that the ultimate judge of the success or failure of military operations is a decision arrived at based on thought. Influencing those thoughts and decisions should weigh heavily into military operations.

4. **Recommendation:** While the FM 3-13 (draft) changes the way that IO supports the Army, from a field perspective it is a move in the right direction and reflects how IO is operating in the combat zone (at least in OEF-P). In addition, it places a realistic expectation on FA30 IO officers.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Chad Clark, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at JSOTF-Philippines.

Chapter 5

Sustainment

Subject: Comprehensive Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)-5 Redistribution and Turn-in Policy

Theater: Iraq & Kuwait

Date: 4 February 2009

1. **Observation:** Current policy does not dictate clear procedures for Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) turn-in.
2. **Discussion:** APS equipment is returned “upon mission completion.” This is often interpreted literally, meaning that if the mission is ongoing, the equipment stays in theater, regardless of the unit in possession. Redistribution Property and Assistance Team (RPAT) yards are now expected without being resourced, to take all APS equipment from a unit which slows the turn-in process to Kuwait. IAW AR 710-1, paragraph 6-4, e, (1). APS equipment will not be further loaned or transferred from the initial recipient without written approval of HQDA.
3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** A statement needs to be added to MOD-5 that PBIC T equipment is not part of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE). Units must submit an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) during the Pre-Deployment phase through the normal ONS process. An additional statement to MOD-5 should also state that units will be responsible for retrograde of that equipment to APS, 401st Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB).
4. **Recommendation:** HQDA G3 publishes a FRAGO directing FORSCOM to inform deploying units they will not fall in on APS-5 (PBIC T) equipment.
5. **Related CALL publications:** None
6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Tripp, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 1st TSC.

Subject: Efficient Redistribution of Serviceable, Non-Expendable Property

Theater: Iraq & Kuwait

Date: 6 February 2009

1. **Observation:** Theater lacks an efficient system for redistribution of serviceable non-expendable, Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) and installation-type equipment.
2. **Discussion:** To avoid unnecessary purchases, the theater needs an efficient, automated means of redistribution of equipment. This is related to being able to objectively determine excess in units. CJTF-101 and MNC-I have developed a system to monitor excess so that subordinate units have visibility. The current solutions for COTS are; Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) (a

total waste), Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP) – Transfer to Iraqis (does not include computers) and DA MOD 4 which allows units to take home equipment no longer needed in theater (<\$5,000.00) with an ARCENT approved exception to policy.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Direction and guidance was needed from DA, Army Materiel Command (AMC) and ARCENT for MNC-I to issue upcoming FRAGOs.

4. **Recommendation:** ARFORs direct units to code unwanted installation-type equipment as “excess” in Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE). Prior to requisitioning equipment, units must query excess in theater. MNC-I will publish a FRAGO authorizing units to turn-in excess serviceable COTS equipment to the Redistribution Property and Assistance Team (RPAT) yards for redistribution to units in need. MNC-I will study the possibility of establishing a warehouse to store COTS equipment in Iraq.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Tripp, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 1st TSC.

Subject: Disposition Instructions of Retrograde Equipment

Theater: Iraq & Kuwait

Date: 9 February 2009

1. **Observation:** Disposition of CL VII Battle Loss / Battle Damaged (BL/BD) and Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) retrograde is requested in Iraq/Afghanistan and requested again in Kuwait.

2. **Discussion:** The expeditious retrograde of equipment out of theater relies heavily on disposition. Today, as we know it, in Iraq and Afghanistan, disposition is requested upon identification of retrograde. The equipment is retrograded to Kuwait. Upon arrival in Kuwait, disposition is requested again. Equipment is held up until disposition is received. This often times causes a significant delay in the retrograde process, especially when being loaded onto a vessel that is CONUS bound.

3. **Lesson Learned:** Disposition of retrograde CL VII should become a unit mission of 1st TSC/4th SB with collaboration from TACOM.

4. **Recommendation:** 1st TSC/4th SB provides examples to TACOM and 401st Army Field Support BDE where disposition instructions were requested twice. Once examples are provided, 1st TSC/4th SB in collaboration with TACOM and 401st Army Field Support BDE will determine why initial disposition instructions do not follow equipment from start to finish. This would reduce the number of times disposition is requested, thus eliminating significant delays in the retrograde process.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Tripp, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 1st TSC.

Subject: Clearing Procedures for Other Services and Agencies

Theater: Kuwait

Date: 23 February 2009

1. **Observation:** Navy, Air Force, and Marine units and other government agencies in possession of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) are not required to clear Theater Property Book (TPB) before departing the Area of Responsibility (AOR).
2. **Discussion:** No policy is in place directing other services that draw Army equipment to clear Theater Property Book (TPB) prior to redeployment. These units often leave the AOR without properly clearing their hand receipt or transferring responsibility. To drop accountability, the TPB initiates a FLIPL through Army channels. The FLIPL is not reported back to or investigated by other services/agencies.
3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Further monitoring for adherence to ARCENT policies needs to be implemented. Directive from CENTCOM is needed to insure adherence from all other services and agencies in Theater.
4. **Recommendation:**
 - ARCENT G4 needs to review current policies. If there is not a policy that prescribes or gives specific guidelines (i.e. a message that clearly identifies the responsibility for all service components/government agencies in the AOR prior to redeployment) requiring TPB clearing requirements the same for all components/government services.
 - ARCENT requests CENTCOM publish a policy or memorandum directing all units and agencies to clear TPB before redeployment.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Tripp, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 1st TSC.

Subject: Rapid Equipping Force Escalation of Force Kits

Theater: Iraq

Date: 23 February 2009

1. **Observation:** A Convoy Security Company (CSC) stations on Joint Base Balad (JBB) recently conducted a Logistics convoy. During the logistics convoy consisting of 39 vehicles made up of Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), Iraqi Transportation Companies (ITC) and the Convoy Security Company (CSC), was

moving from FOB Caldwell to JBB, the unit had an Escalation of Force (EOF) incident.

2. Discussion: We were the last vehicle in the Convoy (M1151) and were equipped with a Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS) System. This is not their standard TTP position for this vehicle; the planned vehicle for this position had a maintenance problem before leaving the FOB Caldwell. The CROWS operator observed an erratic vehicle approaching the convoy at a high rate of speed. The following is the units current TTP to implement EOF during convoy operations. When the vehicle was 100 meters from the convoy the CROWS operator and I employed flashlights by putting our arms out the side windows to flash at the approaching vehicle to let him know to slow down. We employed this tactic several times until the vehicle was within 25 meters of our bumper. The truck commander (TC) then opened his door and aimed his hand held laser at the hood of the oncoming vehicle. The vehicle slowed down and kept a distance of more than 100 meters from the convoy.

a. Background on the CROWS EOF Kit - The previous MNC-I Commander made it a command priority to find a better way for making a decision to use force against local nationals during OIF 06-08. The current TTP is to use hand held spotlights, flashlights, and lasers to warn off approaching vehicles before escalating to warning shots when not equipped with the CROWS System. Rapid Equipping Force (REF) Forward Lab developed a CROWS mounted system with two levels of escalation; a strobe flashlight for first warning and an intense green laser that has a diffuser built into it to gain the driver's attention.



Figure 5-1

b. CROWS EOF Technology - Strobe Light that is a super bright solid state LED flashlight. Circuit added to strobe light at 7Hz which has shown to be effective at drawing visual attention. The second part of the Kit is a Laser that is Bore-sighted GLARE laser interferes with vision of targeted individual. The Human eye is most sensitive to green light. ATEC approved beyond 18 m. The REF equipped units with 20 CROWS EOF solutions in 2006. Feedback was positive, but the concept did not become a standard feature on the CROWS System.

c. Way ahead - The EOF solution must address all EOF incidents not just the CROWS, but in terms of the whole EOF combined with Share the Road. Currently the REF Director has an initiative to assist the 3d ESC on this for their vehicles. The pictures below are of a prototype system the REF put on

vehicles at JBB recently to test for Share the Road effectiveness. It's SUPER bright flashing red LEDs are similar to a cop car, but are much brighter.



Figure 5-2

3. **Lesson Learned:** The REF Forward at Camp Victory Iraq developed the CROWS EOF Kit to improve the decision making process for using force on local nationals during OIF 06-08. The Program Manager (PM) at Picatinny Arsenal tested it and approved for use on the CROWS system. Share the Road has brought on a better answer to the EOF Kit problem. This is an EOF Kit that can be mounted on all vehicles.

4. **Recommendation:** As Share the Road takes shape in the AOR, MNC-I will need a cohesive, holistic, and most importantly a consistent solution to address EOF. My understanding right now is that, should the test trial work with the red LEDs (the next model will be smaller), these super bright flashing red LEDs may become the Share the Road/EOF standard. So what does this mean for CROWS EOF? The REF is pursuing a few the Share the Road kits for 3rd ESC. If these take off as the theater-wide consistent Share the Road/EOF solution, all CF and local nationals will know the standard. The priority should be focused on a standard vehicle EOF Kit.

5. **Related CALL publications:** 07-21: Escalation of Force Handbook (revised edition), 25 Jun 2007

6. **TOD:** LTC Michael J. Falk, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 3d Sustainment Command (Expeditionary). Acknowledgement: LTC Don Phillips, Rapid Equipping Force.

Subject: National Guard Lateral Transfers in support of GWoT

Theater: Kuwait

Date: 19 March 2009

1. **Observation:** DOD Directive 1225.6 (See Appendix 1) required National Guard units to bring equipment to theater and then upon redeployment laterally transfer their MTO&E equipment to the follow on unit. This not only created an

equipment shortage for the redeploying unit but also an enduring supply discipline inequity.

2. **Discussion:** Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) FRAGO 136 equipment that has been transferred in the last five (5) years and is coded with the Property Book in Country (PBIC) Code Y or Z must return to its original owner according to DA FRAGO 136.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** DOD Directive 1225.6 (Appendix 1) was originally intended to expedite units to theater in an equipment austere environment. Unfortunately, an expedient DOD Directive became a long term supply discipline issue which now must be resolved by HQDA G3 and G8.

4. **Recommendation:** Recommend DA provide a directive to resolve the issue. HQDA G3/G8 should work with component updates pending to make lateral transfer 1225.6 payback to eliminate PBIC Y and Z. Resolution is expected by next Army Equipping Enterprise and Reuse Conference (See Appendix 1).

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Tripp, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 1st TSC.

Appendix 1

What GAO Found regarding DOD Directive 1225.6:

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles.

To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard's inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision equipment, vehicles, and radios. Further, as equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed equipment quickly.

To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track equipment National Guard units left overseas and develops replacement plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than \$1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and

implemented plan to replace all National Guard equipment left overseas, Army National Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for addressing the National Guard's equipping needs.

Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008, they are not expected to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the National Guard's equipment requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about \$15.6 billion to convert most of the National Guard's units, but this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the National Guard's equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army's plans.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress plans and funding strategies to address the Army National Guard's equipment shortfalls, accurately track and replace equipment its forces left overseas, and complete planning to integrate the Army National Guard into its modular and rotational force initiatives. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111.

Subject: Building Electrical Fires

Theater: Iraq

Date: 30 March 2009

1. **Observation:** Electrical issues are a way of life in OIF. Much of the initial construction work was done quickly. It is obvious that the buildings would not be acceptable according to building codes in CONUS.

2. **Discussion:**

- a. The fire started in a conference room that was unoccupied at the time. This room is the only room not staffed during the regular duty day. A combination of faulty wiring and a failed light fixture are believed to be the cause of the fire.

- b. The smoke detector gave the earliest indication that something was wrong.
 - c. Over a period of a few weeks prior to the fire, suspicious electrical smells were noticed by occupants of the building. cursory investigations did not reveal the source. In hindsight, the light fixture in the conference room almost certainly failed and caused the fire.
 - d. Upon detection of the fire, personnel acted quickly and safely in suppressing the fire with available fire extinguishers. Personnel also summoned help from nearby firefighters who cleared the building and finished extinguishing the fire.
 - e. Awareness of the issue, good fire protection equipment (smoke detectors and fire extinguishers) and prompt, safe action by Army personnel helped contain the fire to one room, with no casualties or injuries.
3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Maintenance, availability of fire protection equipment, awareness of the issue and prompt action are the best mitigation measures against structure fires in OIF.
4. **Recommendation:** It is recommended that commanders, major cell personnel and leaders at all levels continue to emphasize that the potential for fires in OIF is very real, and that mundane measures such as working smoke detectors and charged/functioning fire extinguishers are very effective protection against injuries, loss of life and loss of U.S. Army property.
5. **Related CALL publications:** None
6. **TOD:** MAJ Steven M. Rachal, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at TF ODIN.

Subject: Container Accountability

Theater: Iraq & Kuwait

Date: 31 March 2009

1. **Observation:** The Army lacks accountability/visibility of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers in the hands of units. Container project managers cannot assign Standard Study Number-Line Item Number Automated Management and Integrating System (SLAMIS) NSN/LINs to containers because they are presently coded as expendable.

2. **Discussion:**

- a. Army Reuse Center code has already been changed to reflect non-expendable.
- b. A new Federal Supply Classification (FSC) has already been established to identify ISO containers (FSC 8150).

c. TACOM-NATICK is responsible for procurement and item management of these containers.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** As the DOD/DOA heads into a more austere environment proper management of resources becomes more critical than ever. Proper accountability of government property has always been a high priority. With the new austere environment this has become a high visibility issue that is more critical than ever.

4. **Recommendation:** Distribute results of HQDA G4, AIDPMO, CASCOM, FORSCOM, TACOM, and AMCOM teleconference on 2 April 2009. This meeting will discuss initiation of ISO containers and the authorizations being added in CTA and completion of like NSN consolidation.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Tripp, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 1st TSC.

Chapter 6

Reconstruction

Subject: Iraqi Reconstruction Funds

Theater: Iraq

Date: 01 November 2008

1. Observation: The Special Inspector General (IG) for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) provides oversight for all funds associated with Iraqi Reconstruction; i.e. Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), etc. SIGIR reports to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and provides quarterly reports directly to Congress. The funds that are spent by commands in Iraq are tracked by local IG's or finance personnel that may have very little experience in audits, as the Army does not have an MOS or specialty for auditors.

2. Discussion: At the end of each quarter, SIGIR produces a report that is broken down into 3 sections:

- Section 1 – observations
- Section 2 - funding, economy, services, governance, security, and justice
- Section 3 - audits, inspections, and investigations.

SIGIR announces new audits and inspections each quarter and can be working from 10 to 35 or more audits and inspections during any one quarter. There could be up to 25 or more SIGIR auditors in country at any given time.

SIGIR audits or inspects the following:

- Money spent on reconstruction projects with large dollar amounts getting their attention
- Anticorruption efforts
- Accountability of equipment purchased for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
- Asset transfer; this includes equipment, buildings, land, etc.
- ISF personnel reporting
- Private security firms
- Buildings and facilities (new and old) covering such things as sewer, water treatment plants, etc.

The SIGIR report is very detailed and the information contained in the report can have a positive or negative effect on one's career if that Soldier is not accounting or

tracking in writing their responsibilities. This is the kind of report that sells newspapers back home in the states. It tells our government officials how and where billions of dollars are spent. The report is also a record of improvements going on in Iraq.

There are many different commands, teams, and individuals in Iraq that have access to funds that are spent for Iraqi reconstruction. These monies have to be accounted or tracked by someone as to the end state of their use. At company level and below, a unit clerk or supply specialist may track the monies spent. Higher-level commands may have a finance specialist to track all of their expenditures.

MNSTC-I has a single Finance Officer who works with SIGIR on a regular basis. He was not trained on performing audits or inspections to track funds prior to his assignment here in Iraq. He has endured “on the job training” and has become very good at juggling six to ten audits or inspections each quarter. His lessons learned have been passed on to others here in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some facets of his battle rhythm when working with SIGIR include:

- Meeting with SIGIR auditors or inspectors every week
- Weekly e-mail contact with them to enhance an excellent working relationship
- His work with them is transparent - he has nothing to hide
- He keeps the MNSTC-I CofS and CG informed weekly with information updates
- He attends the SIGIR audit entrance and exit conferences
- He receives draft reports from the auditors after their inspections which requires written comments back to them (usually within seven to ten days)
- He receives e-mails from MNF-I concerning SIGIR visits to keep him in the loop
- He scans all of the SIGIR reports and provides an executive summary to the command

SIGIR does an excellent job of forcing personnel who have the authority to spend taxpayer’s money to account for their actions. The personnel that work for the Special Inspector General receive training prior to coming into Iraq. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the military personnel who receive this responsibility and must answer to SIGIR.

3. Lessons Learned/TTP:

- Personnel that work with SIGIR and those conducting IG responsibilities, along with finance and supply personnel who track funds, must be made aware of the importance of their duties.

- These personnel also need training on how to track projects and allocate funds prior to arrival in theater. The Inspector General MOS or specialty school does not have any instruction within their POI that addresses working with SIGIR.

4. **Recommendation:** This topic should be addressed at the IG School or a special training course should be offered to prepare personnel for this awesome responsibility.

5. **Related CALL publications:** NA

6. **TOD:** COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at MNSTC-I.

Subject: Civil Affairs and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 7 December 2008

1. **Observation:** Rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan is a “Governance” major emphasis of the Coalition Forces (CF). The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) deployed in the Task Force (TF) Duke (3-1 IBCT) area of operations (AO) has embedded Civil Affairs (CA) elements. The Nangahar Province PRT CA Team currently consists of 9 personnel. Coordination between the TF Duke legal team and the PRT CA element recently addressed rule of law initiatives, issues, and challenges in Nangahar Province.

2. **Discussion:**

a. The TF Duke legal team representatives met with the CA element leader of the PRT during their recent Relief in Place/Transition of Authority (RIP/TOA). During this initial face to face, coordination various items were discussed.

b. The CA element is divided into two teams. Transportation is a limiting factor because a Ground Assault Convoy (GAC) is required during any movement by ground outside the Forward Operating Base (FOB). A GAC in the Jalalabad area requires a minimum of three armored vehicles with appropriate crews. All PRT assets compete for the transportation needed which is generally based on the priority of the mission in question. When the CA teams have a Key Leader Engagement (KLE) scheduled or an opportunity for one arises, transportation availability is critical. In some cases transportation can be accomplished by coordination with the TF Duke legal team, if they are already being transported by a GAC that can pick up the CA team at the PRT FOB en-route to a common location in the Jalalabad City area.

c. A standing requirement for the PRT is to nominate a ROL Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) project on a monthly basis. The CA OIC successfully coordinated with the Brigade Legal section to process

them through the PRT. Examples include training of individuals in judicial procedures, posting radio spots that encourage ROL development, and providing funding for judicial infrastructure construction.

d. The TF Legal team has Civic Books and Comic Books in Pashtun and Dari language available for distribution. The CA team is coordinates the receipt and future distribution to Provincial High Schools, pending prior approval and negotiation with local leaders.

e. When the CA team plans a KLE, which is generally coordinated through the Provincial Government, many local leaders/village elders attend. The ability of the CA team to support a KLE with drinks, food, and any other necessary services to make it successful is further frustrated by the current process requiring a trip to finance at Jalalabad Air Field IOT get the funds. Many times the actual cost is less than \$1,000 USD and the potential positive effect is priceless.

f. The KLE at this level has proven to render a great amount of immediate success because community needs are more easily identified and the CA is better able to respond to the identified needs.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Many ROL Governance initiatives have the greatest possibility of success at the local community level (bottom up) as opposed to a central government level (top down).
- When the local leaders are involved and making decisions and dedicating support, the initiatives have traction. The Afghanistan local nationals in rural areas live in a tribal system where they defer the decision making to their village elders. They live with them, trust them, and do what they say.
- The ability of the CA team to gain positive effects by CERP initiatives is directly related to the support of the people at the lowest level.
- CA is able to attend and support KLE at the tactical, village level while pursuing coordination with Non Government Organizations (NGO) and Other Government Agencies (OGA) also conducting operations in the various AO's.
- Rule of Law initiatives at this level reinforce bureaucratic (top down) central government efforts. KLE at the lowest level with village elders and local Mullahs (religious leaders) that determine what they want/need and then develop programs that fit those wants/needs will assure success.

4. Recommendations:

- The CERP funding process for KLE engagement has to be streamlined. Timing is everything and quick, deliberate action when the conditions are set for success with local leaders should be exploited.

- A standing KLE funding source is required. The funds have to be available within 5 days.
- CA team transportation has to be a priority to the TF Commander. When resources are constrained, the CA must have priority based on potential effect. Coordination with all TF CA and Legal assets is critical to focus the ROL initiatives as non-lethal targeting that wins the hearts and minds of the people.

5. Related CALL publications:

- Know How to Leverage the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), 07 Nov 08.
- Commander's Emergency Response Program Handbook, 31 Mar 08.
- NFTF Agribusiness Development Teams in Afghanistan, Feb 09.

6. TOD: LTC Phil Torrance, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 3/1ID. Acknowledgement: LTC William Fitch, Nangahar PRT Civil Affairs Officer in Charge; MAJ Jonathan Cheney, CPT Michael Vincent and SFC Timothy Conner, 3-1IBCT Brigade Legal Office.

Subject: Agricultural Development Team (ADT)

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 13 March 2009

1. Observation: Nangarhar Agricultural Development Team (ADT) challenges while working Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects in conjunction with the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL). In some instances the Provisional MAIL representative may have conflicting interests with the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) MAIL policies. These conflicts can arise from the actual need of the Province and the perception of the local MAIL representative on how to address the issues and the actual GIROA policy as written or emerging. The ADT strives to assess the needs of the Province in conjunction with the local MAIL representative while at the same time being sensitive to the overall GIROA national strategy. The ADT has faced this conflict where veterinary clinics are involved in the Nangarhar Province.

2. Discussion:

- a. Historically the ADT has aggressively worked with the Nangarhar Provincial MAIL representative. The perception by the ADT and the Provincial leaders is that the relationship is successful currently and has been productive in the past. The ADT has been instrumental in providing funding for building veterinary clinics as well as providing funding for the Provincial Veterinary Laboratory construction and equipping in the past.

- b. Recently the ADT presented a plan to provide funding to build a veterinary clinic that would be owned by the Provincial MAIL and leased to an independent veterinarian. The plan would provide a number of clinics in areas that are currently not covered for veterinary services.
- c. The projects were met with hesitation by the GIRoA MAIL minister because they conflicted with the Veterinary Privatization Plan.
- d. This Plan pays Afghanistan veterinarians a lump sum to establish their private veterinarian practice as opposed to being a government provided service.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

All CERP projects are vetted and approved through proper channels.

- In the case of the veterinarian clinics the vetting process at the Division level did not successfully interdict Provincial veterinary clinic initiatives that were not in accordance with GIRoA policy. That vetting channel has been opened and future projects in this area can now be aligned with national Afghanistan policy.
- The ADT, CERP processing through Brigade Combat Team Civil Military Operations and the Division vetting process support the GIRoA veterinary clinic infrastructure policy in Afghanistan.
- Pressure remains to obligate CERP funds within the proper guidelines. That challenge is to insure projects are in accordance with local, provincial, and national policies.

4. Recommendation:

- Current emerging Afghanistan Theater guidance points to an overall increase in the civilian sector deployed to support OEF success. These experts should be engaged in the CERP process at all levels to provide the continuity knowledge base to provide accountability that the spending efforts support the national strategy and fit in prudent reconstruction efforts.
- Military personnel should receive clear and concise guidance on their ongoing operations and should be free to pursue local and provincial initiatives that appear to fit the national strategy.
- The accountability part has to be integrated with a system that understands the overall plan and can interdict project planning and funding that does not meet guidelines.

5. Related CALL publications:

- A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries, 24 Jul 08.
- RC-East Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) Information Brief, Nov 08.

- Commander's Emergency Response Program Handbook, 31 Mar 08.

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Torrance, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at 3-1 IBCT. Acknowledgement: COL John Spiszar, 3-1 IBCT; LTC David Boyles, 935th ADT; LTC Steven Cabosky, Nangarhar PRT; SFC Timothy Murray, 3-1 IBCT; LTC William Smith, CJTF 101 TF MED.

Chapter 7

Foreign Security Forces

Subject: Out of Country Training

Theater: Iraq, MNSTC-I

Date: 20 January 2009

1. **Observation:** The U.S. military needs to oversee out-of-country training for the Iraqi military.

2. **Discussion:** With Iraq's budget declining due to the decline in oil prices, they cannot afford to buy the necessary aircraft to conduct training for pilots. They cannot afford to buy fast moving jets. All they own at this point is helicopters. It would be cheaper to send the pilots to Fort Rucker than to send Fort Rucker instructors to Iraq. The Iraqi Minister of Defense (MOD) is the approving authority for out of country training and he will not delegate it down. Based on interviews, he often likes to send friends or associates instead of more qualified people to higher level training. The U.S. or coalition needs to have insight into who comes to the U.S. for training. The U.S. has to say "no" to the MOD if he tries to send personnel that do not fit the operational and training needs of the Iraqi military.

3. **Lesson Learned:** Do not take for face value that the personnel coming into the U.S. are the right people with the right qualifications for specific training.

4. **Recommendation:** Provide pre-testing for all personnel coming into the U.S. for specific training with a minimum standard for attendance.

5. **Related CALL products:** NA

6. **TOD:** COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at MNSTC-I.

Subject: Buddy Aid/First Aid Implementation Lacking in Afghan National Army (ANA) Combat Units

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 14 January 2009

1. **Observation:** ANA Soldiers do not employ life saving first aid techniques that they learn in basic training to control bleeding in combat. This results in the needless deaths of ANA Soldiers.

2. **Discussion:**

a. New Soldiers who are trained at KMTC (Kabul Military Training Center) are taught first aid as a portion of their basic training. They are taught the use of bandages, pressure bandages, tourniquets and other techniques.

b. When an Afghan Soldier is wounded, he is placed in a vehicle and ground MEDEVAC'd to an aid station or hospital. The problem lies in the lack of first aid given to the wounded Soldier while in transit. While Soldiers understand the urgency of getting the wounded to qualified medical personnel, they either do not grasp the concept of buddy aid, do not see the need, or do not feel that they should practice first aid (controlling bleeding) on the wounded. The result is oftentimes a Soldier who bleeds out before he gets to an aid station.

c. ANA Soldiers who have bled to death during transport often had wounds that, while life threatening if not treated, were survivable if their fellow Soldiers applied basic first aid (controlling bleeding). Based on interviews, several cases have resulted in death because there was no pressure bandage or tourniquet used or available.

d. Field expedient bandages and tourniquets are nonexistent. There is little to no evidence that ANA Soldiers have improvised when needed to save a life. If the factory bandage or tourniquet isn't available, they let their wounded comrade go without.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Soldiers with serious wounds who don't get first aid during transport to an aid station often die due to loss of blood
- Getting wounded soldiers transported to aid stations is not enough
- Soldiers cannot perform life saving first aid without the necessary equipment
- First Aid training must be continuously reinforced at all levels, especially at the squad and platoon levels
- Effective and timely treatment is critical to saving lives
- Soldiers need to know how to make field expedient tourniquets and pressure bandages

4. Recommendation:

- First Aid must be continuously reinforced as a part of mission preparation and rehearsals
- Soldiers need to do practical exercise demonstrating proficiency in each of the sub tasks for first aid
- The CAT Tourniquet and the Israeli Bandage (with different name) must be provided to all ANA Soldiers
- Soldiers should be taught how to make field expedient dressings, pressure bandages, and tourniquets

- NCOs must ensure Soldiers know how to render first aid and that Soldiers actually perform first aid when required
- Afghan Lessons Learned Center (ALLC) will develop a “Buddy Aid” smart card with photos to show ANA Soldiers how to give “Buddy Aid”

5. Related CALL publications: N/A

6. TOD: MAJ Brian Perazone, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at the Afghan Lessons Learned Center (ALLC).

Subject: Cooperation between Coalition Forces, Afghan Forces and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) is Critical to Mission Success

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 25 January 2009

1. Observation: Coalition Forces do not always properly utilize/integrate the Afghan National Army (ANA) when conducting combat operations causing friction between CF, Mentors, and mentees.

2. Discussion:

a. CF dominates their battle space with both the enemy and their partners. While dominating battle space with your enemies is tactically sound, dominating your partners is not. Task Force policy is for ANA units to take the lead whenever possible during operations. This puts the ANA “face” on an operation. This contributes to the legitimacy of the GIRoA (Government, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan)

b. Case in point: A CF TF was conducting cordon and search operations. In order to maintain “an ANA face” on the mission, the CF unit would come into an area and take ANA personnel for the mission without coordinating with the ANA Commander or the mentors that advise that ANA unit.

c. In another case, a CF unit would come into an area and “borrow” ANA for a mission. Unfortunately for the ANA, their mission was to screen the advance of the CF unit.

d. In both cases, the ANA were either used without regard for their role as a legitimate and proficient organization on the battlefield.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- When CF utilizes ANA/ANP in conjunction with their mission, they must consult with the ANA unit leadership and their mentors (ETT’s) prior to the mission.
- ANA need to be given a legitimate role in the mission. When ANA view themselves as being after the fact addition to the mission trust becomes an

issue. Morale, motivation and esprit de corps are the driving forces of effective combat units. Actions that negatively impact on these factors degrade mission capability. There will be no effective cooperation between the ANA and CF.

- Not including the ANA and their mentors in the planning process of the mission fosters a level of frustration that can and does impact the mission. Without all stake holders on board, the mission will not be as effective as if it was a unified effort.
- The ANA/ANP and their ETT Mentors can and will contribute to the success of an operation. Seek their advice and counsel. They live in the battlespace much more intimately than the CF Unit does in many cases. They have a “finger on the pulse” of the locals that the CF Unit usually doesn’t have.

4. **Recommendation:**

- CF needs to consult with the ANA leadership and their ETT Mentors prior to any missions in which CF plan to utilize ANA.
- Trust is a tremendous factor when dealing with ANA. Steps should be taken to foster and build trust between Coalition Forces and their ANA counterparts at every level. Listen to the mentors who live and work with the ANA everyday.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Brian Perazone, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at ALLC.

Subject: Coalition Forces Respecting Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Role in Planning and Conducting Operations

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 30 January 2009

1. **Observation:** Coalition Forces (CF) does not always respect the ANSF role even after command guidance to give primacy to the ANSF in planning and conducting operations.

2. **Discussion:**

a. The CF in the area in which I operate my Police Mentor Team (PMT) has taken the lead in almost all aspects of planning and conducting operations. However, they have been hesitant to give it up. The difficulty is that the ANSF are, in many cases, not up to the task of taking the lead yet. The major difficulty here is in the planning phase where the ANSF need the most work. The biggest shortfall in the ANSF planning capability is not in figuring out what to do but in the desire to integrate ANSF agencies and to develop a vision and intent. The CF historically, in this area, has mistrusted

ANSF in the area of Operations Security (OPSEC) and resists giving prior notice of operations to them. This concern is typically not justified when dealing with high level commanders (COL and above).

b. The Police General whom I am assigned to mentor is a former Mujahadeen commander and as such has a firm grasp on referent power and how to make things happen. He also has a widespread effective network of relationships that would facilitate getting things done. Despite his record of service and commitment to the counter insurgency effort, he has not demonstrated a desire to leverage this to coordinate with the ANA Commander even though they know each other well. He has recently begun to express frustration at the fact that Afghans are not in the lead in operations.

c. His frustration is justified, however, in that CF has a habit of dropping by his checkpoints and grabbing a police patrolman at the last minute to take to a house and search. If his patrolman is killed or wounded then district commanders get relieved and the survivor benefits are void because the policeman was taking part in an unauthorized operation. This practice, while being technically legal, violates the intent of Afghan law. Police must be present to obtain entry to an Afghan residence. The issue is jurisdictional propriety. We do the same thing in the states when a federal agency with more expertise in site exploitation targets a residence. They get a local cop to open the door. The problem is when the Fed's turn around and get in trouble for violating intent or procedure and then say that they were just supporting the local police. It is the same thing as what I just described in Afghanistan.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** The TF in the area has been receptive to PMT overtures to bring in the District Police Commander to plan days ahead of time and have even asked him to nominate targets for police led action. The TF has even promised their support in those operations that the police plan. This is a huge stride forward and fulfills the central ideal of the mentoring program. Recent operations in the area have shown a quantum leap in the quality of police activity in searches. They have become an integral part in the home searches, acting with firmness, professionalism, and integrity. They have taught the CF tricks on finding things. The Afghan National Police (ANP), at their initiative, released to the TF Commander a list of insurgents in the area and those who have weapons but are not aligned.

4. **Recommendation:** Mentors (Embedded Training Teams (ETT) and PMT must be prepared to mentor the CF in their area just as much as the ANSF because the problem with progress in planning and operations is not one sided. ANSF will never be ready to take the lead unless they are allowed to take the lead. To achieve this means accepting risk, working through the results, and not blaming other stakeholders for shortcomings. Bottom line, we must be inclusive in our thinking and support all players (Afghan, CF, NGO, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), etc.).

5. Related CALL publications:

- CALL Handbook, 09-02, First 100 Days OEF, Nov 08.
- CALL Handbook, 08-46, OEF ETT First 100 Days, Jul 08.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Brian Perazone, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at the Afghan Lessons Learned Center (ALLC). Acknowledgement: LTC George Leone, PMT TM LDR.

Subject: Non-Permissive Mentor Team Composition

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 2 March 2009

1. **Observation:** There is some discussion about the standard team composition for Non-Permissive Mentor Team Composition that ensures effective and safe operations.

2. Discussion:

a. Properly manned and equipped military and police mentor teams leads to maximum effectiveness. The current threat environment in Afghanistan requires a minimum of four Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) to conduct operations. Each UAH must have a minimum three Soldiers to properly operate the vehicle: driver, assistant-driver, and gunner. Each UAH can carry an additional two personnel, making the total UAH capacity five pax.

b. Ideally a full nine man infantry squad should be used to provide the crew and the drivers, gunners and assistant drivers for the UAHs as security. Using a full MTO&E squad allows for the entire unit to be employed without breaking up unit integrity. Embedded training teams consist of four team members: team chief, operations mentor, personnel mentor and a logistics mentor. In most cases three of the mentors will have to also perform the function as assistant driver on three of the UAHs. Interpreters are required for effective communication with local nationals. Ideally there should be four interpreters, one each for the four mentors to effectively conduct their operations. A minimum of two interpreters are required to conduct operations. Interpreters never crew the UAH and are carried only as passengers. Medics/combat lifesavers should be part of the team but they can also be security personnel or mentors.

c. Operational considerations will cause adjustments to the manning of the Mentor Teams when conducting operations. Leadership should make every effort to fully/optimally man the mentor teams for best effect. If minimal manning is used to conduct operations it should not become a routinely accepted way of doing business, and should never be less than 12 military personnel manning the vehicles or less than three personnel per UAH.

d. Contracted senior mentors are also part of the overall mentor team. They typically have their own transportation and security and ride in an armored sport utility vehicle (ASUV). ASUVs do not have the manning requirements of UAH and are not required to move in four vehicle packets, but they do move in concert with the four UAH convoy for safety reasons. Optimal contractor manning is four contractors per mentor team, two per ASUV. Typical contractor manning is two pax per mentor team either one per ASUV or two contractors in a single ASUV. Contractor mentors usually have one driver per ASUV that doubles as security for the contractors.

e. The optimal Non-permissive Mentor Team should consist of 21 pax in four UAHs and two ASUVs:

- (1) Nine man infantry squad for security
- (2) Four man Mentor Team
- (3) Four interpreters
- (4) Four senior mentors contractors(not counting security)

f. The minimal Non-permissive Mentor Team should consist of no less than 16 pax in four UAHs, and 1-2 ASUVs:

- (1) Eight infantrymen for security
- (2) Four man Mentor Team
- (3) Two interpreters
- (4) Two senior mentor contractors (not counting security)

3. **Lesson Learned:** For optimal non-permissive mentor team operations teams need to be at least 21 personnel, and the minimal manning for operations should be no less than 16.

4. **Recommendation:**

- Mentor team operations should always be manned at 100% (21 pax) when-ever possible. When 100% manning is not possible operations should never be conducted below 80% (16 pax).
- Optimal and minimal manning should be written into doctrine.
- Operations should be planned reflecting optimal manning, and should not be planned at below minimal manning.
- Training should reflect the optimal and minimal manning.

5. Related CALL publications:

- 08-46 OEF ETT F100 Days, 30 Jul 08.
- 03-35 Operation Enduring Freedom Handbook II, 22 Nov 06.

6. TOD: LTC Rick McConoughey, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan.

Subject: International Zone Security

Theater: Iraq

Date: 15 January 2009

1. Observation: The International Zone (IZ) transition of moving from the Coalition back to Iraqi control is ongoing without serious incidents.

2. Discussion: Many Coalition leaders were concerned about security being lax as the Iraqi military assumed responsibility for vehicular and personnel traffic coming in and out of the IZ. The Iraqi military searches all vehicles and personnel while the Coalition provides over-watch. To date, there have been no serious incidents reported.

a. The Government of Iraq (GoI) along with guests from the Coalition Forces has been staging significant events in the IZ, with both Iraqi and US public affairs personnel, to capture the speeches and pictures. The Iraqi TV and Iraqi Newspapers covered all major events. The Palace and surrounding grounds being back under GoI control was one of the big events; this is an important symbol for the people of Iraq to show that the sovereignty of their country is returning. The idea is to inform the citizens of Iraq of the security gains that are now present in most of Iraq and that the GoI is in control of their country.

b. Another major event, a Pass and Review of several Iraqi military units, staged at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which is a popular military monument in the IZ. This event was a celebration of both the IZ transition and the Iraqi Military Day and was attended by government officials and military commanders from all across Iraq. This included the Prime Minister, the President of Iraq, Minister of Defense, Secretary of Defense, and many other high ranking members of the Iraqi military.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: Iraqi – US relationship is strengthened by the show of acceptance by the Coalition that the Iraqi military has the lead in security of the IZ.

4. Recommendation: The Coalition should adhere to the Security Agreement and support the GoI towards sovereignty.

5. Related CALL publications: NA

6. TOD: COL Dennis Knappen, CALL Theater Observer Detachment Officer at MNSTC-I.

Subject: UXOs

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 23 Dec 2008

1. Observation: Soldiers become casualties as a result of disregarding the obvious.

2. Discussion:

- a. Recently an incident involving Soviet land mines and Coalition Forces (CF) resulted in the death of one CF Soldier and the traumatic amputation of a limb of another CF Soldier.
- b. Soldiers were operating within the confines of an Afghan National Army (ANA) camp where there is a co-located CF camp. These Soldiers were using a training range that has been regularly used for several years.
- c. Soldiers were traveling on a regularly used hard packed dirt road but they were off the roadway approximately 50 meters. At the time there was a mine strike resulting in one Soldier losing his leg. Another Soldier moved to provide first aid and realized he was at risk also. The Soldier became distressed, disoriented and sat down. The Soldier did not clear his immediate area (conducting 5's and 25's) and when he sat down he came in contact with an antipersonnel mine and was killed instantly by the blast.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Location in question was near a number of old Russian battle positions. Standard procedure for the Russian Army was to mine battle positions. In Afghanistan, OLD BATTLE POSITIONS = MINES.
- Soldiers were using the area thought it was cleared of mines/UXOs. They were told that the ANA had cleared the area months ago.
- Soldiers drove their vehicle off of a regularly traveled and clearly defined road and moved onto terrain that was not normally navigated by troops or vehicles.
- The second Soldier panicked and did not follow standard procedures for self extraction from a minefield.

4. Recommendation:

- All leaders need to reinforce the threat of UXOs/Mines with their Soldiers. Mine awareness must be a priority for all Soldiers.

- Check with your S2 about mine threat in your AO.
- Always do your 5's and 25's in an unknown area.
- Stay on hard packed roads/tracks.
- Do not rely on the ANA to clear UXOs.
- Do not panic if you find yourself in a minefield.
- Assume that any former Russian battle position is mined.
- Follow your training. Practice your drills.

5. **Related CALL publications:** Afghanistan: UXO/Mine Awareness Class, 07 Dec 06.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Brian Perazone, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at ALLC.

Subject: Advice for Advisors

Theater: Philippines, OEF-P

Date: 20 March 2009

1. **Observation:** LTG Caldwell announced that the Army will field eight Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB). These AABs will begin deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan over the next year. Combat advisors are nothing new, the US military has been advising other militaries for decades. Sometimes we've gotten it right, sometimes not. Here are some reflections from the last 10 months performing in an advisory role to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

2. **Discussion:**

a. There are two things I think about when getting ready to do something in the Philippines; how does this support the mission and how does this support the commander? If it can't answer those questions then don't do it. To add context to what think about the Three P's: Presence, Perseverance and Patience.

b. In order to effect a situation you need to be present. It also means when dealing with a host national counterpart that you need to maintain contact as much as you can.

c. Things will eventually go wrong; it is how we handle those situations that demonstrate our cool headedness and comfort with ambiguity. Realize in those situations that you must persevere. Security Force Assistance missions are long term. You must have strategic patience in knowing that the mission is going to go on for years, because that is what it takes to win. Accept tactical failures for the strategic victory, because more often than not our mere presence will end up causing us to win in the long run.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Advising and assisting another country's military requires a different set of skills. As advisors we must focus on the skill sets that help us to accomplish the mission as advisors.

4. **Recommendation:** Here are some other thoughts about advising a host nation counterpart to reflect on.

- “Relax and understand the people. The key to success here is the people.” Advisors must be people oriented. This goes against most of our military training which says that we must be mission oriented. As an advisor you must use your intelligence and rapport to accomplish the mission, not brute force or combat power; brute force and combat power are things your counterpart employs.
- Study and understand the culture. Not the “don’t show the bottom of your feet culture” that you can get out of the Lonely Planet books, but a doctorate level of understanding when it comes to the social, economic, tribal, religious, political and familial factors that influence and motivate people. Immerse yourself in the host nation’s culture to the point of being able to anticipate actions and the reasons why your host acts. Understanding these motivational factors is the key to advising your counterpart.
- Deal only with commanders and leaders. Communicating with host nation subordinates not only undermines your role as an advisor to the commander, but it undermines your counterpart’s position as the commander. While we may feel that by fraternizing with host nation service members it gives us the “ground truth,” it really is not our ground truth to gain. The more you deal directly with your counterpart and less with everyone else the more trust you build between the two of you.
- When in doubt, keep your mouth shut. Nothing is more irritating than an extremely chatty guest. Keep your exchanges on a professional level until strong rapport is built. Try to stick to doctrinal advice (it builds your credibility that you’ve actually read it since you know that your host has). Nothing loses credibility quicker than giving bad advice, so don’t. Stay clear of conversations about politics and religion; expressing your opinion on either can be a deal breaker. Never make comments about the opposite sex; nothing displays a lack of professionalism and respect more than making comments about a female host national (and the same goes for females making comments about males).
- Be present but not seen. Your ideal role is to have the ear of your counterpart but not be in the spot light; that is the role for your counterpart. You can’t think that you are going to be able to go into someone’s house and be able to sit in the “big boy chair;” you might do it once but it will be the last time you will be invited.
- Never give orders. Giving orders is something that you reserve for your own troops, not someone else’s. In addition to giving orders, giving spot corrections or laying a hand directly on a host nation subordinate is a huge misstep.

- It's not our military. Transmitting our US standards to another country's military should be a goal, not a standard. Respect their way of doing things because while it may not be our way, it might work for them. Setting goals too high quite often only leads to resentment when your counterpart continually hears, "back in my old unit."
- Bring gifts not presents. Santa Claus brings presents, you should bring gifts, and not too lavish but just as a sign of respect. Every time a new Army field manual is published I present a hard copy to my counterpart. He is appreciative since he doesn't always have access to a TRADOC like support system and reams of paper to print. A token of appreciation is much better received than a lavish present that reflects opulence.
- Training a host nation military is not basic training. When someone says training, some of our most visceral experiences were in our basic training. However, using this model for training another country's military is counterproductive. We need to be a little more creative in our techniques. Think of yourself as a role model, a coach and a mentor. Offer advice, but not criticism. When a situation goes bad, and one inevitably will, offer solutions but don't digress to a pedagogical after action review; Socratic discussion might work better.
- Keep your sense of humor. Military operations are serious business because lives are involved. Let's face it, funny things happen, normally to ourselves. Don't take yourself so seriously that you can't laugh, especially at yourself. A little bit of self effacing humor will go a long way to endearing you to your host.

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Chad Clark, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at JSOTF-P.

Subject: Thoughts on Training for Advise and Assist Brigades

Theater: Philippines, OEF-P

Date: 24 March 09

1. **Observation:** Eight brigades are planned for special training to become the Army's first Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs), LTG Caldwell, commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, announced at the Brookings Institution on March 27. The official definition for the AAB says, "an advise and assist brigade is a modular brigade combat team augmented, based on the requirements of the operational environment, with enabling assets and capabilities to support a distributed security force assistance mission."

2. **Discussion:** Advise and Assist missions occur at every level of war: tactical, operational and strategic. Each level requires its own set of competencies. One would envision that generally AABs will operate at the tactical and operational levels, and the unit leadership must have an understanding of the strategic level. From an OEF-P perspective, the Advise and Assist mission conducted here requires

the JSOTF-P commander to operate at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The JSOTF works 'through, by and with' the Armed Forces of the Philippines to accomplish the JSOTF's mission. Everything the JSOTF does is Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational. It is not uncommon for the JSOTF to meet with the US Country Team, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, a Non-governmental Organization, in addition to hosting a US Congressional Delegation. This requires seasoned service members that understand the mission, the context of a situation, and its relevance to other events. It is tough business. Therefore, I offer the following suggestions to prospective AABs.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: Advising and assisting other nations' military forces requires unique personal and unit level attributes. These are not always the same as required by a Brigade Combat Team (BCTs). As some of our BCTs transition to AABs it is imperative that leaders recognize the distinction between the two sets of skills required and focus on what will be required to accomplish the mission.

4. Recommendation: Planning and training for the mission.

- The Tactical Level: The day to day interaction with a host nation counterpart requires a lot patience and understanding. Never forget that the unit you are working with is not your unit and not in the US military. Quite often we are tempted to project our own set of standards, both military and cultural, onto the unit with which we are working. Never forget that you are there as an advisor and the way that you lead is through role modeling, coaching and mentoring, not by being "hands on." In order to accomplish your mission you have to be a constant student of culture (all aspects to include the economy, social structure, religion, tribes, language, familial customs, and etc). Learning the culture is a never ending process and will allow you to anticipate your counterpart's actions because you will understand the motivation behind it.
- The Operational Level: Train and prepare to address causes not symptoms. Most of us should be aware of what are the root causes of insurgencies after operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, HOA, OEF-TS, and OEF-P. Fighting the causes will take care of the symptoms. For example, training to react to an ambush does not stop ambushes from occurring. What causes the ambush? A willful enemy, a population that supports them, a distain for the host nation and US forces? The causes for the willful enemy, supportive population, distain and distrust can be addressed through a combination of Civil Military Operations, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and sound tactical operations. 80-90% of what JSOTF-Philippines does is Civil Military Engagement and other activities, while a relatively small percentage of effort is devoted to supporting Philippine direct action combat operations (through ISR, Intel sharing, transportation, etc.). Operational level leadership must also become adept at interacting with non-military folk. Learn the language and the nuances of the interagency and of non-governmental organizations. This pays tremendous dividends in the long run.
- The Strategic Level: It is vital that all leaders at the strategic level have the same goals and end state (even if they don't publically agree on what they are). Nothing can cause failure faster than either not aligning the

tactics with the operations to achieve the strategic end state, or not effectively communicating that strategic end state (pretty common sense; it would be but common sense sometimes is quite uncommon). Leaders must become experts in Joint, Interagency and Multinational operations. Take a trip to Washington DC and meet your counterpart or their bosses. Travel to the Service or Joint Headquarters you will be working with and meet the staff officers. As we all know, at the higher levels it is a personality based business. These relationships will come in useful when you need to get things done in a pinch. The three things the strategic level operators should be able to do well is communicate globally (both through soldier, leader and outside the military engagement), be a people connector (getting the right people to meet and work together, building synergy), and be creative and adaptive in their leadership (which includes gaining and maintaining rapport with people inside and outside of your organization).

5. **Related CALL publications:** None

6. **TOD:** LTC Chad Clark, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at JSOTF-Philippines.

Chapter 8

Medical

Subject: The Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT)

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 31 January 2009

1. **Observation:** “Exsanguination” (bleeding to death) from extremity injuries continues to be one of the leading causes of preventable death on the battlefield.

2. **Discussion:** A Soldier died this fall in Operation Enduring Freedom from a single gunshot wound that severed the femoral artery. CJTF-101 Surgeon Cell conducted a literature search to determine if there are lessons learned that could lead to reducing deaths from compressible extremity hemorrhage.

A study published in 2008 provides data from a seven-month study conducted in Iraq during 2006. During this study:

- 232 patients had tourniquets applied
- 31 (13.4%) of these patients died (Kragh et al., 2008)
- Five patients qualified for tourniquet use during this study, i.e. compressible limb hemorrhage, but there was no effort to apply a tourniquet in the prehospital environment. All five patients (100%) died even though they were at a hospital within 15 minutes of injury.
- Out of the 232 patients, 10 had signs of shock prior to tourniquet usage and nine of the 10 (90%) of them died (Kragh et al., 2008).

Another study released in 2008, states that 57 percent of deaths during the study may have been prevented by earlier tourniquet use. Of 165 patients in this study, 98 patients (59%) had severe extremity injuries that warranted tourniquet use. However, Soldiers and medics did not apply a single tourniquet (Beekley et al., 2008). Of those 98 patients, 26.3 percent had traumatic amputations (Beekley et al., 2008). The underlying message from these studies is that proper and timely use of tourniquets increases the probability of survival. A better understanding of the CAT Tourniquet should assist Soldiers in the proper and timely application of this lifesaving device and reduce mortality.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- The Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT) is the Army’s tourniquet of choice (Kragh et al., 2008).
- The CAT Tourniquet completely stopped bleeding 100% of the time under laboratory testing, i.e., ideal conditions with well-trained participants, and was 79% effective in the 2006 Iraq study (Kragh et al., 2008). Of the various tourniquets used during this study, the CAT Tourniquet performed the best under field conditions (Kragh et al., 2008).

- Primary reasons for tourniquet failure are device narrowness, incorrect usage, and device breakage (Kragh et al., 2008; J. Kragh, personal communication, October 22, 2008).
- The CAT Tourniquet is most effective in saving lives when applied prior to signs of shock developing (Kragh et al., 2008).
- Early tourniquet use may increase survivability (Beekley et al., 2008).

4. Recommendation:

Note: For this writing, a preventable death when discussing hemorrhage from an extremity means there was room to properly place a tourniquet and compress the artery to stop all bleeding. Under no circumstances does this author support the belief that all Soldiers will survive these types of compressible injuries. The tactical situation is part of the determining factor in a casualty's outcome. The recommendations focus on tourniquet training, application techniques, and design.

- Army should maintain Combat Lifesaver (CLS) qualification as a requirement to graduate Basic Combat Training.
- Army should require annual CLS sustainment training and requalification no differently than weapons qualification, Annual Combat Medic Validation Testing (ACMS-VT) Table VIII qualification, or the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). This requirement should include funding for medical supplies and equipment as well as adverse personal actions for failure to meet the training requirement.
- Avoid using your personal CAT Tourniquet on a casualty. You may need your tourniquet before you can replace it. Always use the CAT Tourniquet from the Soldier's Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) first, then a CAT Tourniquet from a CLS Bag, Warrior Aid Litter Kit (WALK), or a Medic's aid bag if required to stop all bleeding.
- Immediately use the CAT Tourniquet when there is no time to control severe bleeding, e.g., Care under Fire, on an amputation of any extremity, or anytime bleeding cannot be controlled by other means.
- Always use the friction adapter on the CAT Tourniquet when applied to the thigh to reduce or prevent loosening.
- Consider additional tightening or the use of a second tourniquet on the upper thigh, side-by-side and proximal (closer to the core of the body) to the first tourniquet if hemorrhage control is uncertain. See Figure 8-1 below.



Figure 8-1. An example of using two CAT Tourniquets on the thigh

- Update the CAT Tourniquet design requirements to include applying a nonslip (gritty) surface to the windlass during manufacturing to reduce hand slippage due to blood on hands/gloves while tightening.
- Reinforce all tourniquets with 2-3 inch tape (included in the IFAK) after tightening to prevent it from loosening. See Figure 8-2.



Figure 8-2. An example of using tape to secure the CAT Tourniquet in place to prevent slippage

- Reassess tourniquet tightness and slippage each time the casualty moves.
- As the tactical situation allows, avoid padding under a tourniquet or applying the tourniquet on top of clothing (This typically results in tourniquet slippage and continued bleeding).
- NEVER use the CAT Tourniquet from the IFAK to conduct training. CAT Tourniquet design limits it to a onetime use product. Either order the CAT Tourniquet trainer, or have additional CAT Tourniquets on hand to conduct training. If the latter recommendation is used, spray paint the windlass to ensure there is no confusion that it/they are for training only.

- Conduct additional research into finding the appropriate width of a tourniquet. The tourniquet needs to stop bleeding without using multiple tourniquets and must be effective in battlefield conditions.
- Pull additional slack out of the CAT Tourniquet if four 180-degree turns does not stop all bleeding. More turning will deform the tourniquet and it will not be effective.

5. Related CALL publications: CALL Handbook 06-18, Tactical Combat Casualty Care.

6. TOD: SGM Elmer W. Feick, CALL Theater Observation Detachment (LNO) at CJTF-101.

7. References:

- Beekley, A. C., et al. (2008). Prehospital tourniquet use in Operation Iraqi Freedom: effect on hemorrhage control and outcomes. The Journal of Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care [Electronic Version].
- Kragh, J. F., et al. (2008). Practical use of emergency tourniquets to stop bleeding in major limb trauma, The Journal of Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care [Electronic Version].

8. Acknowledgments: MSG Keith M. Stafford, CJTF-101 Surgeon Sergeant Major, and LTC Mark A. McGrail, CJTF-101 Command Surgeon

Subject: Industrial Hygiene Equipment

Theater: Iraq

Date: 2 January 2009

1. Observation: Industrial hygiene equipment to test chemical and physical hazards is critical to the preventive medicine mission in Iraq in order to protect the lives of both the Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF) and Coalition Forces (CF).

2. Discussion:

- a. On the MTOE of Preventive Medicine Detachments is the Medical Equipment Set-Industrial Hygiene (MES-IH). The components of this set give detachments the capability to identify specific occupational health hazards in a field environment that include both physical and chemical hazards. Many times the MES-IH is not 100% complete in reserve units. Further, calibration remains a problem for most of the equipment in the kit.
- b. The Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) has stated that it will provide missing equipment for the MES-IH. Through its MES-IH augmentation push package, CHPPM is able to provide detachments with equipment it needs in order to complete its industrial

hygiene mission. Calibration is done in advance on this equipment and is superior to the ones contained in the MES-IH.

c. Problems in the push program exist in OIF 08-09. Because equipment was pushed to detachments while in theater, many units are non-mission capable for IH while they are waiting for that equipment to be sent. When requesting the equipment itself, CHPPM personnel questioned the need for the equipment. Further, receipt of the equipment took up to four months. During this time, requests were not completed to perform industrial hygiene tests. Soldier's lives were at risk due to the lack of equipment availability.

3. **Lessons Learned/TTP:** Industrial hygiene equipment is becoming more important to the preventive medicine mission in Iraq.

4. **Recommendation:** Ensure all equipment is present and calibrated prior to deployment will help mission success. Further, requesting for push packages from CHPPM prior to boots on ground may help with the lag time in receipt of the equipment. Even then, a turnaround of 4 months is unacceptable. CHPPM needs to identify and prioritize units deploying and ensure that they receive all the necessary equipment prior to leaving CONUS.

5. **Related CALL Products:** Lessons Learned from a Battalion Aid Station in Iraq by 1LT Kenneth Rodriguez, CALL Website.

6. **TOD:** LTC Gordon Tate, CALL LNO to MNC-I.

Subject: Mental Fitness

Theater: Philippines

Date: 4 January 09

1. **Observation:** Western cultures have traditionally maintained a significant separation between mind and body. As a result, many service members train their bodies and then attend to mental fitness, if at all, as a separate activity. When you improve the connection between body and mind, you can more effectively develop your mental skills – skills that can give you an edge on the battlefield (especially since your mind and body have a significant physical connection). Ensuring that there is a good connection between mental and physical fitness can increase performance and reduce work related stress.

2. **Discussion:**

a. Last week on TV, I saw a performance by the brilliant fingerstyle guitarist Pierre Bensusan. He told a story about a contract offer to perform in Spain. The only condition in the contract was that he improvises the entire show. Being a master of improvisation, he signed, but as the date of the show approached, he became increasingly nervous. Finally, he sought the counsel of a friend. "Look at it this way," said the friend, "you won't forget anything."

b. What a relief it is when the burdens our minds create...disappear. To be sure, much of mental skills work in the military – and in the performing arts – is about “using your mind on your mind,” and that certainly can be effective. However, it is not the only way to master the mental obstacles to optimal performance.

c. Why do we take on the challenges of a physically demanding nature, challenges that call on us to use – and learn – these mental skills? Why do we willingly take on the suffering, the disappointments, and the adversity of tough challenges, long deployments, and brutal training?

d. One of the reasons, even if we are not aware of it, is frequently this: The body is the Great Equalizer for the mind. When the mind is too dominant, we are out of balance, and then we often pay the price – with anxiety, runaway thoughts, and so many other kinds of distress. However, when we draw on the power and wisdom in our bodies, we can restore balance, bring mind and body closer, and relieve the burdens that our rampant minds so often create.

e. In Western cultures, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes had a huge impact on the particular kind of dualistic view that separates mind and body. However, in the last 50 years, Western civilization inches, and now crawls (or perhaps toddles) toward an integral view of personhood. Fortunately, it has been Toddling “under the influence” of Eastern philosophies, among other forces. Therefore, when I use the phrase “power and wisdom in our bodies,” I am not talking about wattage and facts. I am suggesting that your consciousness – your experience of yourself – is not located only in your heart rate monitor or GPS. Your emotions, sensations, past experiences, self-awareness, and even your thoughts all have a physical component. Discovering and living the physical in everything you experience, sometimes called being more in your body, can be the key to better mental fitness, and a better experience/performance under stress.

3. Lessons Learned/TTP:

- **Mind-Body Techniques:** Led by Dr.’s such as Herbert Benson, mind-body medicine began to guide what he calls the “third modality” in health care – in addition to pharmaceuticals and surgery – for maintaining health and well-being: self-care. Therefore, over the years health care practitioners, researchers, and the people they have worked with identified a number of things you can do to better integrate mind and body for performance.
- **Improving Your Emotional Awareness.** Emotions affect health, energy, and strength, and of course, the reverse is true as well. If you have even occasional difficulty answering the question, “How do you feel about that?” you may need to look to your body for the answer rather than your mind. For example, when you are anxious, stressed, or fearful, where do you feel it in your body? Does your chest tighten? Does your breathing get shallow? Do you get knots in your stomach? Biofeedback can build your awareness and skill here. As you strengthen all the pathways to and from your emotions, you give yourself a better chance to handle your emotions, experience them, and use them.

- Grounding Yourself. (No, I'm not talking about banishing yourself to your room) If you want to be more in your body, becoming more conscious of your physical connection with the Earth is a great way to drive your consciousness downward from your head. In other words, gravity works; so sometimes, when you are sitting, standing, or walking, practice paying attention to the contact of your feet (or shoes) with the ground. Finally, there is nothing more grounding than paying attention to your breath – the place, perhaps, where Body and Mind meet.
- Being conscious about what you put in your body. Paying more attention to what you eat and drink – the choices you make, the impact those choices have, but also the actual moment-by-moment experience of eating and drinking – can be a great way to narrow the mind-body gap.
- Continuing to discover your physical potential. There is amazing transformative power in physical, body-focused experience. You can use your physical training in overcoming adversity or work related stress. You can use your fitness regime to learn what is possible for your mind and body to achieve. Yet as you stretch your physical limits, perceived or real threats to your body may raise visceral fear and anxiety, perhaps evoking the fundamental mortality that underlies every moment of life. However, in facing that challenge by drawing on everything within yourself – from mind, body, and spirit – you go through a crucible and a stronger person emerges.
- Many of the most successful competitors, at any level, are set apart from others by mental strength. In addition, your mind will be much stronger when it has a good connection, good communication, and good balance with your body.

4. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** The five core skills of mental fitness: Goal Setting, Self-Talk, Managing Emotions, Concentration, and Communication. Ensuring that there is a good connection between mental and physical fitness can increase performance and reduce work related stress.

5. **Related CALL Products:** N/A.

6. **TOD:** LTC Chad Clark, CALL LNO to CJSOTF-P.

Subject: OEF MEDEVAC Training

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 13 January 2009

1. **Observation:** A large number of medical evacuations (MEDEVAC) in the Task Force Duke (TF Duke) area of operations (AO) require the use of hoist operations due to the mountainous environment and the inability of ground accessibility by either ground transport or availability of a safe landing zone (LZ). Preparing the patient for hoist operations in the field is time consuming, particularly for someone unfamiliar with the available systems. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) deploying to

mountainous AO can very easily familiarize them with the SKEDCO litter system, which provides a secure means for hoisting a litter patient. Thorough and repetitive training with the system during pre-deployment preparation and incorporating the process into Combat Lifesaver (CLS) Certification or Recertification can provide the necessary familiarization.

2. Discussion: The most obvious challenge to Aviation assets during hoist operations is the restrictive terrain. MEDEVAC aviation crews must be creative and maneuver the aircraft in order to lower the flight medic to the ground, maneuver the aircraft accounting for winds, potential escape routes, reference points, and clearance from the terrain itself. An added dimension is the vulnerability of the crew as it hovers over a hostile area, often with the ground unit still in contact with the enemy. When the MEDEVAC crew, the flight medic, and the ground crew conducts training and familiarized with hoist operations the extractions will go efficiently, thus reducing the overall exposure from the environment and the enemy.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- When the Soldiers were familiar with the SKEDCO litter and even initiated the packaging of the casualty prior to the MEDEVAC crew's arrival, the process went quickly. If the ground units do not receive this training they offer little or no help to the flight medic, the process could be very time consuming.
- Increased time during MEDEVAC operations has only negative consequences. These extend to the patient in need of urgent treatment. Personnel and equipment exposed to enemy and the hostile environment. Add to this fuel consumption of the aircraft and the continuing focus of all involved to get it done.

4. Recommendation: Ground units deploying to Afghanistan should have ample hands on training with SKEDCO products prior to deployment. The training has to get to the actual rigging of the patient into a litter. If the patient is pre-packaged by the ground element, it saves time and consequently lives. Units should first consider the classes offered by the Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) and request live hoist at the Combat Training Center (CTC). Another potential training resource is the Coast Guard for live hoist training. Soldiers can practice under the supervision of a flight medic rigging a patient correctly repeatedly with the proper equipment provided. Soldiers should also understand that the hoist is the "last resort" for extraction. Experience has taught that many times a suitable LZ may require only a small movement of the patient. If the aircraft can make a one-wheel or two-wheel landing on a ridgeline or rooftops and eliminate the hoist it greatly reduces the extraction time. Observation Posts and patrols in the area should identify these sites prior to the missions. Incorporating this training during CLS and the pre-deployment preparation will reduce the danger and time involved with MEDEVAC hoist operations.

5. Related CALL publications: Leader's Handbook, "The First 100 Days," No. 07-27, Jul 07.

6. TOD: LTC Phil Torrance, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 3-1ID.

7. Acknowledgements: COL John Spiszar, 3-1 IBCT Commander; MAJ Jose Galvan, TF Duke Aviation Rep; MAJ Bernard Harrington, TF Outfront S-3; CPT Justin Madill, TF Outfront Flight Surgeon; 1LT Timothy Anderson, 1-26 INF Medical Officer; SGT Moreno, Sr Medic in the Korengal; D, Dr. Jeffrey Bordin, TF Duke Red Team Leader.

Subject: Continued Blood Loss Due to Loosening Tourniquets Resulting in Preventable Fatalities

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 2 February 2009

1. Observation: Multiple factors can result in the loosening of a properly applied tourniquet resulting in continued blood loss.

2. Discussion:

a. Surgeons and health care providers are reporting that wounded Soldiers and civilians have presented at aid stations with tourniquets that, while properly applied initially, have loosened, resulting in continued blood loss and even death. Most medical training manuals and protocols depict casualty care as a linear sequence of events. In the case of the tourniquet, Soldiers are customarily instructed that once the tourniquet is in place, to move directly to airway management and to continue along a linear sequence of events.

b. It is important that the tourniquet be rechecked throughout the process of administering aid and as the patient is transferred from the battlefield to subsequent levels of care. The tourniquet can loosen during patient transport due to, but not limited to:

(1) Changes in limb volume as well as muscle contraction which could cause fluctuations in the diameter of the limb and a relative loosening of the tourniquet.

(2) The material properties of tourniquet material could relax under mechanical strain, resulting in a loosening of the tourniquet with stable limb diameter and then continued blood loss.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: It is important that as the field medic, combat lifesaver, or battle buddy administering first aid to a casualty, returns to check the tourniquet to maintain its position and tightness, and determine if adjustments are necessary to staunch the flow of blood. Additionally, the tourniquet should be rechecked after patient transfer or change in provider. This process is depicted in Fig. 1.

4. Recommendation: Warrior Tasks, Combat Lifesaver Training, Combat Field Medic Training, and appropriate publications including field manuals, handbooks, and graphic training aids should be edited to include steps to maintain the tourniquet tightness during subsequent aid steps.

5. **Related CALL publications:** No. 06-18, Tactical Combat Casualty Care Handbook, Dec 08.

6. **TOD:** MAJ Kit Parker, CALL Theater Observation Detachment Officer at 3BCT 10th MTN. Acknowledgement: MAJ Jennifer Bell, Brigade Surgeon, 3BCT, 10th MTN.

Chapter 9

Civil-Military Operations

Subject: Iraqi Transportation Network

Theater: Iraq

Date: 27 January 2009

1. **Observation:** The 3rd Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) headquartered at Join Base Balad (JBB), Iraq is working with Coalition Forces, the local Iraqi community and business leaders to develop the Iraqi Trucking Network (ITN). The program will stimulate the nation's trucking industry and reduce the number of coalition-escorted convoys on highways located throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO).

2. **Discussion:**

- a. The goals of the ITN program are the establishment of a robust Iraqi trucking industry, the improvement of intertribal and provincial relationships, and the opening of new trade opportunities between those governing bodies. As business ventures expand throughout the nation, greater regional cooperation will be encouraged, which in turn, increase civil capacity.
- b. The ITN is an all-Iraqi consortium of tribally owned trucking companies that move cargo across Iraq. ITN has completed more than 3,800 missions to date, without incident or loss of cargo. The ITN routinely moves mission critical sustainment cargo across Iraq in support of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces (CF). Once the ITN vehicles arrive at a FOB, a Force Protection Company (FPC) escorts them from the Entry Control Point (ECP) to the central receiving and shipping point (CRSP) yard. ITN convoys are escorted back to the ECP when they are ready for movement.
- c. The ITN program was first designed as a 2007 tribal engagement initiative, with the first contract awarded in early 2008. The concept focused on establishing Iraqi-owned and operated commercial ground transportation companies. The ITN provided significant tribal involvement with each trucking firm and formed the basis for the development of a future Iraqi logistics system that would be capable of providing robust support to both military and commercial customers.
- d. The Support Operations Section (SPO) plans, coordinates, and monitors the movements of all ITN trucks from cargo entry to delivery to exit. Through their hard work and positive attitude, local tribal members are proving they can provide a reliable, effective and timely transportation network. The ITN initiative puts us a step closer to ISF self-sustainment, and provides an invaluable economic base on which the Iraqis can build. Although ITN is one of many transitional initiatives throughout Iraq, it is critical for establishing a durable Iraqi logistical framework. For example, a canning business in one area of the AOR cannot run their production line at

full capacity because there currently is not a viable transportation network to move the goods to the local markets.

e. Another important advantage of the ITN for Coalition Forces is that it reduces the number of military convoys/escorts on the road, which translates into fewer Coalition Forces personnel and equipment losses. No military escort is required for ITN convoys outside the wire, so the ITN moves cargo unescorted, independently guaranteeing the safe delivery of its contents. Coalition convoys require up to seven escort vehicles to move cargo in the AOR. ITN trucks are not required to use the same routes or travel at the same speeds as Coalition convoys. Therefore, ITN convoys can do missions in about half the time. However, there are limitations on what the ITN is permitted to move. The SPO Section identifies the cargo, its destination, and whether it meets the criteria of ITN allowable cargo. ITN moves a variety of cargo, such as construction materials, water tanks, shower trailers, and water bottles. ITN gives these trucking companies a start hauling cargo into Iraq, in turn helping build the transportation network. In the future, ITN will be the building block for commerce, as well as a transportation support system for Coalition forces and the Iraqi Army.

f. One major challenge in the implementation of additional ITN programs is the requirement to set up more tribal engagements. There are key leadership figures within each tribe and federation of tribes found within the provinces. Coalition Forces (CF) need to identify meeting locations that are both secure and do not infringe upon existing political arrangements between tribes or federations. Another challenge is the screening and vetting process required to identify drivers who meet all entry requirements for access to CF bases. The ITN partnership must determine support staffing and equipment requirements needed to process driver applications in a timely manner. The best locations for possible application centers must be determined, along with the development of contract requirements for current and future state operations.

g. The MNC-I staff has standardized the reporting and command systems required to track the convoy coordination flow across the ITO. There are on-going reviews of the current ITN program that focus on trying to improve the network. Two suggested improvements from these reviews include use of the Iraqi Railroad, as well as the Distribution Center (Truck-Stop Concept). Additionally, the command, by way of the IBIZ section, is trying to convince the ITN Companies to use part of their fleet of trucks in the civilian sector as a means to build civil capacity.

h. The Distribution Center (Truck Stop Concept) and the Iraqi Railroad will help build up the ITN by assisting in distribution management along the major routes in Iraq. The Truck Stops would be set up much like a US truck stop, and would eliminate the need for an ITN holding area at Coalition bases. ITN trucks will be able to drop their cargo and move to a truck stop to receive their next mission. This will move products to the marketplace more efficiently, optimizing time and cost sharing, while increasing reliability and economic growth.

i. This month, the ITN distribution capability tested the Iraqi Railroad (IRR) by conducting a proof of principal (POP). The IRR successfully moved cargo from Taji to the Port of Umm Qasr. This is the first time since 2004 that cargo has been moved by the railroad. A 20-car train owned and operated by the Government of Iraq picked up 40 empty containers for movement to the port of Umm Qasr. The operation was an important step in linking Iraqi trucking, Iraqi rail, and Iraqi port operations. This is also a critical link in the entire rebuilding effort of Iraq. As the Iraqi railroad moves more cargo for both the Iraqis and Coalition forces during retrograde, it will decrease the number of trucks on the road carrying supplies and equipment. The successful use of the IRR will be a critical component in the transportation infrastructure of Iraq. Setting up a cargo transfer yard in Taji where cargo will be stored and then loaded on rail cars for movement to the port, will greatly increase the efficiency of the ITN. Iraq has a geographic advantage that will allow it to function as a central hub for moving cargo from the port at Umm Qasr to Turkey, Syria, and Jordan, in turn increasing civil capacity.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- As the sustainment community headquarters for the ITO, the 3D ESC must develop comprehensive tools to standardize how its subordinate commands track ITN convoy coordination across its multiple battle space boundaries for both Iraqi and CF commands. The 3D ESC must oversee the coordination and communication of sustainment community responsibilities associated with the integration of the ITN program into other Iraqi First initiatives like the Iraqi Railroad program and the Truck Stop Concept. In addition, the 3D ESC staff must investigate the potential opportunities to integrate the ITN program as a part of its lift support capabilities in future retrograde missions. This includes the possibility of utilizing the ITN for Iraqi Army or civilian sector missions in addition to CF transport missions.
- Another significant opportunity for the ITN program is the potential to build the economy. This effort could be a major impact on the growth of Iraq as we start moving forward to a Steady State, and Iraq becomes a Strategic Partner. By expanding local business distribution networks, the ITN will link local markets to the distribution chain, provide a more balanced import, and export market, promoting private sector business growth. ITN's long-term strategy should focus primarily on local and regional economic needs, with Coalition Force support second.

4. Recommendation:

- Coalition Forces must look to expand opportunities for incorporating this tribal trucking consortium into their routine distribution operations in their battle space. Sustainment units need to evaluate future opportunities for utilizing the ITN program to support retrograde operations of equipment and materials, as the footprint of CF units continues to decrease in the months ahead. Leaders must continue to engage local tribal and federation leadership in developing new ITN companies in their areas to support current and future business opportunities. This will be

even more critical as Coalition Forces restructure into fewer bases farther away from major population centers in Iraq.

- Key stakeholders at the MND and Iraqi Army levels must work now to integrate new opportunities with training initiatives that will increase the capabilities of the ITN program. It is critical that the ITN become proficient at new material-handling procedures and agreements such as integration into the Global Freight Management System. Senior contracting agencies should continue to review and update existing ITN contracts that will expand opportunities and provide CF commands with greater access to this support organization.

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: LTC Michael J. Falk, Center for Army Lessons Learned Theater Observation Detachment Liaison Officer embedded with the 3d Sustainment Command (Expeditionary).

Subject: POLAD synchronization

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 31 December 2008

1. Observation: Combatant Commanders in support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) “own” their respective areas of operation (AO) within Afghanistan. Task Force Duke has the responsibility for the Provinces of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Laghman, and Kunar (N2KL) along with the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) elements and considerable other military capabilities that include Air, Route Clearance, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The TF also works in conjunction with other government agencies to accomplish their strategic objectives in Afghanistan. The Department of State (DOS), Red Team, Human Terrain Team, the United States Public Health Service (USPHS), and others agencies are present at the TF headquarters in Jalalabad. United States Government (USG) planning calls for the deployment of hundreds of additional civilians to the Afghan theater of operations. As currently constituted, the DOS officers at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) report directly to the Embassy in Kabul, often bypassing the Brigade. Likewise, the Embassy tasks the PRT officers directly. Overall, the integration and interaction with these non-military components is an emerging challenge for the TF Command that must be addressed in order to enhance operational planning and execution of the Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

2. Discussion: The TF Duke Commander and staff must plan and execute operations that move toward accomplishment of the stated mission. TF Duke: 3rd BCT, 1st ID conducts COIN Operations in AO Duke to defeat Anti-Afghan Forces and build the capability of the ANSF in order to secure the population and to enable the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government to extend and maintain its authority and influence throughout AO Duke. The DOS provides a Political Advisor (POLAD) to TF Duke. The POLAD is uniquely positioned to provide the commander and staff political advice for operational planning and execution. The

POLAD can also synchronize with other non-military agency expertise and assets in order to keep TF Duke Command and staff informed on potential non-lethal courses of action that can enhance mission accomplishment.

3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** The process of empowering the Brigade POLAD with the ability to synchronize the non-military agency assets is being implemented. The DOS is changing its command structure so that DOS personnel in the PRTs will report through the TF POLAD as opposed direct to the US Embassy. This ensures information being developed within the TF AO by non-military organizations is immediately accessible to the TF Commander, and that there is a coherent chain of authority in both the military and civilian avenues. This is a critical requirement in order to ensure guidance and strategic objectives are synchronized.

4. **Recommendation:** The TF POLAD position should evaluate all other DOS personnel in the TF AO. The DOS should provide oversight and support as needed to the other non-military assets within the TF AO. This will facilitate a seamless sharing of information and advice from vital assets to the TF Commander and staff for operations planning and execution. It will also ensure that messages from the field are coordinated.

5. **Related CALL publications:** Security Force Assistance, Dec 08; CALL NFTF Human Terrain Team Debrief, Apr 08.

6. **TOD:** LTC Phil Torrance, CALL TOD to 3-1 IBCT, Task Force Duke in Regional Command East, Afghanistan. Acknowledgements: Jeremy Brenner, TF Duke POLAD, Dr. Jeffrey Bordin, TF Duke Red Team Leader; Capt Maurice Sheehan, United States Public Health Service embed to 3-1 IBCT; MAJ Michael Jackson, 3-1 IBCT S7; and MAJ Skip Masterson, 3-1 IBCT S9.

Subject: The Civil Military Integration of Airspace Control

Theater: Iraq

Date: 7 January 2009

1. **Observation:** There are many simple solutions that can enhance the capability of transferring authority of the Iraqi airspace to the Iraqis while maintaining the capability to conduct combat operations.

2. **Discussion:**

a. BAGHDAD (AFP) – Air France-KLM and Iraq’s transport ministry have signed a preliminary accord which will see Iraqi Airways taking off for European destinations and Baghdad’s airport being renovated.

b. The memorandum of understanding has three points: first, technical, which covers technically enabling Iraqi Airways to code-share flights with Air France-KLM. Air France-KLM will, secondly, assist Iraqi Airways to enable it to fly international flights, including to Europe.

c. The deal also includes, thirdly, the revamp of Baghdad's third terminal to international standards and the construction of airports in Iraq through investment companies.

d. Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) is naturally a critical hub in the economic development of Iraq. The simple goal is to allow for increased civil traffic. Because of the ongoing security missions, it is also a very crowded airspace. Certainly the new (1 JAN 09) Security Agreement is forcing Coalition Forces to fly more "neighborly" (higher altitudes, skirting the city where the mission allows, flying more at night), but military missions still require the highest priority. Civilian airlines will not travel freely to BIAP unless they continue to feel secure—and insurance companies will not allow it (the cost would be prohibitive).

e. While "flying more neighborly" may work well in the Baghdad area, it is not the model for the rest of the OE. And at the Strategic Level, the Air Force's charter is to get Mosul and Basrah up with Air Traffic Control systems. The limiting factor is language. English is the language of International Air Traffic Control and getting Iraqis trained and level 4 proficient in English takes time—a long time.

f. BIAP does now have Iraqis in the tower. American counterparts serve as backups and mentors, but the change is in place. The key is to create simple tools to help the Iraqis control the airspace confidently and continue to allow Coalition Forces to conduct military operations. "KISS" is perhaps the single oldest military acronym, but when it comes to Civil-Military Operations it requires some outside of the box thinking. One such example is the MNC-I C3 Air Zone Wheel.




Figure 9-1

g. The Zone Wheel is a very simple concept. It is a simple pie chart that encompasses the BIAP area: concentric circles and equidistant slices of the pie. Thus zones can be defined as A1 through L5—60 separate zones. Coalition Forces can then dictate to the Iraqi Air Traffic Controllers which zones around Baghdad are closed to civilian aircraft. Initially there was some fear that this would be divulging classified information. While rationale for closing a zone may be classified—the actual closure is not. Therefore Coalition Forces can dictate the closure without divulging any

information and the Iraqi Air Traffic Controllers can simply place the wheel over BIAP and utilize this information as they route incoming and outgoing aircraft. Telling a civilian airliner that the runway at Taji is closed is just as important as letting the Coalition Forces know—although not everyone needs to know it is closed for repair for example.

h. This simple concept allows the military to keep civilian or Iraqi military aircraft out of the air space without divulging the rationale—be it troops in contact, unmanned aerial surveillance, artillery fire or gunship support to state some obvious examples. Yet it is non-standard, non-doctrinal and not a schoolhouse solution. And in the end, enhances civil capabilities without diminishing military operations, thus assisting in the overall economic development of Iraq.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- The Zone Wheel can divide Civil-Military Airspace into 60 (or more/less) easy to identify zones that can be closed for military purposes without divulging classified information.
- The limiting factor in turning over the control of Iraqi airspace to the Iraqi people is language proficiency—required to meet international standards.

4. Recommendation: COIN Operations require simplicity, “outside the box” thinking, flexibility and a focus on the second and third order effects.

5. Related CALL publications:

- 05-25 Leader’s Guide to A2C2 at Brigade and below, 11 Dec 08.
- 07-14 OIF-OEF Airspace Command and Control CAAT IIR, 15 Oct 06.

6. TOD: MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB.

Chapter 10

Public Affairs

Subject: Unit Historical Officer (UHO)

Theater: Afghanistan

Date: 5 December 2008

1. Observation: If you are a Unit Historical Officer (UHO) at the Brigade-level or lower, you may have been selected by your commander to carry on the responsibility of collecting and documenting your unit's history. To some this is good news and to others this actually may trigger feelings of anguish and frustration. When other Historical officers, just like you, were selected for this position, they too struggled with thoughts like, "Why me, I have absolutely no interest in history," or they just had no idea what a UHO does. Don't let those thoughts and feelings get you down. Once you understand how important maintaining your unit's history is, what it entails, and how fun and easy it can be, you'll wish it wasn't just an additional duty and you'll want to do it full-time.

2. Discussion: For many years, the Army has realized the importance of maintaining a record of what unit's do during times of peace and war. The documents, photographs, videos, and artifacts that are collected serve a far greater purpose than telling the unit's story. These collections serve to establish new doctrine through lessons learned, preserve the stories of the Soldiers who gave their lives in support of our country, provide guidance to commanders in making informed decisions should our country be involved in similar operations elsewhere or in the same region, and much more. Unit Historical Officers play a big role in making sure this happens. This is where the problem begins. The problem is that many UHOs either don't put this collection high on their priority list, because they don't understand its importance, or they don't collect the information they are supposed to, because they don't know what to collect or how to collect it.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP: After Operation Desert Storm, critical documentation on the activities and locations of participating units and Soldiers could not be found. This was caused by a failure to prepare and preserve records of the contingency operation. The consequences of this failure adversely affected Soldiers in the documentation of possible causes for Gulf War illnesses. The same thing could be said about Operation Enduring Freedom. From 2002-2007, there were no Military History Detachments deployed to Afghanistan and many UHOs didn't complete their duties IAW Army Regulations. Therefore, this information is having to be tracked down and is possibly lost forever at a cost to the individual Soldier and the Army as a whole.

4. Recommendation: UHOs can collect history from a variety of different mediums and sources. (A listing of possible historical material to collect is provided in the CJTF-101 SIPR portal site identified below). If you collect using the following six steps, your job is 85% complete:

- Base your collection on a three question approach:
 - What have we planned? (CONOP Briefs)

- What happened along the way? (Daily SITREPs, Commander's Daily Update Assessment (CUA))
- What was the final result? (CUA, After Action Reviews)
- Do what you can to collect the four basic documents in order to successfully complete this additional duty.
- Establish a simple SOP to follow. You are the appointed UHO. Within reason, you make the rules. If others get the routine down, your collection will create itself.
- Learn the history of the unit. You do not need to know every intricate detail down to every past commander and Sergeant Major's name. However, you should know the highlights of its history. You can use this knowledge to outline what you really want to focus on.
- If directed to write a historical summary, write the summary as the history happens. You can also use the chronology approach by keeping a running list of significant unit events based on date and time. This list then serves as a guide while you write the summary.
- Make contact and work with your division historian. Remember, he/she is employed full time to collect, research, and promote history. Use this resource to your advantage.

The information given to you in this article was not meant to replace any Army Regulations or SOPs, but it was designed to help you consolidate and prioritize the things that are most important for you to do as a UHO. I still highly advise that you familiarize yourself with all ARs and SOPs on the collecting and preservation of history to ensure you are meeting specific command requirements that may be set forth outside of what is mentioned here. All UHO references can be found on the CJTF-101 site.

5. Related CALL Publications: None

6. **TOD:** SGM Elmer Feick, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at CJTF-101.
Acknowledgement: SSG William R. McGinnis, 102nd MHD.

Subject: Creative Ideas in the Brigade Public Affairs Office

Theater: Iraq

Date: 12 January 2009

1. **Observation:** Creativity on the part of the Public Affairs Officer can lead to small victories that enhances a unit's warfighting capabilities.

2. Discussion:

a. In December 2008, during OIF 08-10, the OIC of Catfish Air was also the Public Affairs Officer for Task Force 34. Task Force 34 is a National Guard Aviation Brigade representing 12 different states and families back home. Through personal connections he received a gift of more than 250 real NFL Jerseys representing all of the various teams. Although he could distribute them for the holidays and reach over 10% of the Soldiers in the brigade, he sought a more creative plan.

b. The PAO and his team decided that to receive a jersey the Soldiers would need to come by the Public Affairs Office and record a “shout-out” to their favorite team. A “shout-out” is simply a video taped message from the troops to any appropriate recipient back home—in this case the local football team. The Public Affairs team then uploads the video to DVIDS (Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System) where local media outlets have access to the database for broadcast purposes. The use of the jerseys resulted in a long line at their office where Soldiers patiently waited to do their “shout-outs”.

c. After only a week, a number of Soldiers received messages and emails from friends and family back home. They had seen the Soldier on the local television station holding their jersey and cheering on their favorite team. It was a morale booster for a number of these Soldiers, their families and friends at what has become one of the more difficult emotional times during the deployment—the holidays—the time when separation from family is the most difficult. The PAO and his team brought a little Christmas spirit to his Soldiers and his creativity in the distribution of the jerseys gave his Public Affairs team and DVIDS an important success story during OIF 08-10.

3. Lesson Learned/TTP:

- Sometimes Soldiers can bring more to the fight than their weapon.
- With a little creativity DVIDS can be an important tool for the Public Affairs office.

4. Recommendation: Course of action analysis leverages available resources to achieve multiple mission accomplishments.

5. Related CALL publications: None

6. TOD: MAJ Chris Barra, CALL Theater Observation Detachment at 34th CAB.
Acknowledgement: MAJ Roy Fuhrmann, 34th CAB.

Subject: Terminology Intent

Theater: Iraq

Date: 12 March 09

1. **Observation:** Terminology is important in different cultures around the world.
2. **Discussion:**
 - a. The U.S. Military is planning and implementing a “responsible drawdown” versus a “responsible withdrawal” of combat forces in Iraq. In some languages the use of specific words does not translate well or their meaning is twisted by having multiple interpretations. The words drawdown and withdrawal are two such words that give off different meanings depending on the speaker’s intent and his audience.
 - b. In the preparation of specific documents that outline the U.S. Military’s strategies in Iraq, and will also be viewed by many personnel in the civilian sector, the implications of correct wording will/can give the perception of success or failure. A drawdown is what is currently happening in Iraq as the Iraqi Security Forces are taking more responsibility in the security of their Country. The U.S. Military has successfully completed a lot of their missions and a responsible drawdown is appropriate.
3. **Lesson Learned/TTP:** Choose the wording of documents carefully when developing something that others will read and pass on to others who will form opinions on success or failure.
4. **Recommendation:** Proof read; allow others to critique prior to dissemination.
5. **Related CALL publications:** None
6. **TOD:** COL Dennis Knappen, CALL, Theater Observation Detachment at MNSTC-I.

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